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Bernard W. Bell
Abstract
This paper explores Congress’ power to limit state and local authorities’ use of
eminent domain to further economic revitalization. More particularly, it examines
whether Congress can constrain the discretion to invoke eminent domain which
state and local officials appear entitled to under the Supreme Court’s recent de-
cision in Kelo v. City of New London, — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). The
question involves and exploration and assessment of the Supreme Court’s recent
jurisprudence regarding federalism and judicial supremacy.
In providing that private property may not be taken for “public use” without
just compensation, the Fifth Amendment implicitly precludes government offi-
cials from compelling citizens to relinquish their property for something other
than a “public use.” However, the United States Supreme Court has long defined
“public use” expansively, so expansively that the federal courts do not meaning-
fully review government officials’ justifications for invoking eminent domain. In
Kelo, the Court revisited its deferential approach. Kelo involved a claim that a
municipality’s attempt to take land by eminent domain and transfer it to a private
entity, as a part of an economic revitalization plan, did not qualify as a taking
for a “public use,” and thus was constitutionally prohibited. The Court ultimately
reaffirmed its expansive definition of “public use.”
The decision not only sparked public outrage and state legislative initiatives to
restrict the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment, but attracted con-
gressional attention. The House enacted a resolution disapproving the decision
and an appropriations rider barring funding to enforce the ruling. At least three
bills have been introduced in the House and Senate to withhold federal funds to
economic revitalization projects sited in whole or in part of land acquired by local
authorities using eminent domain. This paper concludes that Congress has power
to constrain state and local use of eminent domain under the Enforcement Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, and that Congress’
power to proceed under the Spending Clause may not be as expansive as it ap-
pears.
The Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to limit
state and local authorities use of eminent domain to protect property owner’s Fifth
Amendment rights. Because the Court recognizes citizen’s rights to prevent the
taking of their property for “private use” by another, but faces problems in enforc-
ing that right, Congress may take some precisely-tailored actions that will give the
right practical protection. Such measures might include: 1) altering the measure
of “just compensation” due when property is taken for economic development, 2)
specifying minimal procedures to assure that state and local officials make em-
inent domain decisions in a transparent and politically-accountable manner, 3)
establishing rebuttable presumptions that in certain circumstances a taking is for
a “private,” not a “public,” use, or 4) prohibiting the use of eminent domain alto-
gether in certain situations.
The Commerce Clause also gives Congress some leeway to legislate with regard
to state and local reliance upon eminent domain. Congress may take steps to en-
sure that eminent domain, which serves as an alternative to the market for real
estate, does not operate in an economically wasteful manner or harm involuntary
participants in the process. Congress may also take steps to address the conse-
quences of any undue influence interstate commercial enterprises gain over local
governments by their ability to play one tax-strapped locality off against another,
and one of those consequences may be the excessive or oppressive use of eminent
domain. However, the Court may more vigorously police congressional limita-
tions on state use of eminent domain than congressional legislation conflicting
with states’ assertions of their regulatory powers. The Court may conclude that
the power of eminent domain, like the privilege of sovereign immunity, is such
an inherent and essential aspect of sovereignty that the constitutionally-mandated
respect for the states as independent sovereigns imposes special constraints on
congressional authority. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 748-49
(1999)(discussing sovereign immunity).
Congress’ spending clause powers appear virtually unlimited — the Court has not
found Congress to have exceeded its Spending Clause authority since the Lochner
Era. Not surprisingly, then, Congress’ initial response to Kelo focuses on denying
federal funding to states and localities that exercise the eminent domain powers
recognized in Kelo. The limits on Congress’ power to condition federal funding
on waiver of certain individual rights and sovereign prerogatives has bedeviled
courts and commentators in a variety of contexts. The issue is most often dis-
cussed in terms of “unconstitutional conditions.” The paper categorizes the federal
government’s interest in imposing grant limitations as: 1) “program defining,” 2)
“symbolic” or “dissociative,” 3) “functional,” or 4) “protective.” Congress should
have more leeway in imposing grant conditions that serve functional purposes as
opposed to symbolic of dissociative purposes. Ultimately, Congress’ interest in
limiting support for state and local projects sited in whole or in part on land ac-
quired by eminent domain, is really a symbolic or dissociative one, which merely
permits Congress to ensure state and local authorities do not use federal funds to
acquire property taken by eminent domain. The symbolic interest does not support
the scope of the grant conditions currently contemplated by Congress, prohibiting
all funding in connection with a redevelopment project sited in whole or in part
on land acquired by eminent domain. While the paper’s analysis focuses on grant
conditions regarding eminent domain, the general analysis of government grant
conditions has a much wider application.
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Legislatively Revising Kelo v. City of New London:
Eminent Domain, Federalism, and Congressional Powers
by Bernard W. Bell*
In providing that private property may not be taken for “public use” without just
compensation, the Fifth Amendment implicitly precludes government officials from compelling
citizens to relinquish their property for something other than a “public use.”  However, the United
States Supreme Court has long defined “public use” expansively, so expansively that the federal
courts do not meaningfully review government officials’ justifications for invoking eminent domain.1
Many state courts have also treated government officials’ invocations of eminent domain with nearly
complete deference.   In general, the United States Supreme Court has been somewhat sensitive to2
traditional property rights.  Indeed, it has increasingly protected such rights, by expanding the
definition of a “taking,”  and thereby enlarging government officials’ obligations to proffer “just3
compensation.”  Nevertheless, its refusal to constrain government’s use on the takings power has
come under severe criticism from those with varied perspectives.  4
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In Kelo v. New London,  the Court reconsidered its deferential approach, in the context of5
local officials’ use of eminent domain to acquire properties in conjunction with economic
development efforts.   In recent years, localities have sought to pursue economic revitalization plans,6
often relying upon eminent domain to acquire land needed for those redevelopment projects. The
Court not only rejected the challenge to New London’s invocation of its eminent domain powers to
acquire land for a major redevelopment project, but crafted an opinion that is quite deferential to
governmental authorities.  Indeed, the type of review that the opinion embraces resembles the
extremely deferential “rational basis” review employed by the Court in examining equal protection
and due process challenges to government actions that involve neither “suspect classifications” nor
“fundamental rights.”    Such a reaction is hardly surprising, because the inquiry raises similar issues7
about the relative roles of judges and democratically-elected officials in determining the
government’s role in the society, and therefore the purposes governments can legitimately pursue.8
It is not clear, however, whether the Court, if left to its own devices, would ultimately produce a
jurisprudence that resembles “rational basis” review or some more robust form of review instead.
 Justice Kennedy’s special concurrence suggests some concerns that might lead him to invalidate
certain takings and to engage in more than perfunctory review of officials’ determinations that the
taking qualifies as a “public use.”9
The reaction to the Court’s decision has been swift and sharp.  Opinion polls have shown a
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art28
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public sharply critical of the decision.   Four states have already taken legislative action to restrict10
the use of eminent domain for economic revitalization.  Lawmakers in at least 17 states have begun,
or announced plans to begin, legislative initiatives in response to the Court’s decision.  Several states
have created commissions to study the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment efforts.11
Indeed, the State of Connecticut, from which Kelo v. City of New London arose, has already
considered a bill to restrict the use of eminent domain.   While the bill was defeated, the Governor12
has called for a moratorium on the use of eminent domain until the legislature reconvenes.  On the
federal level, the United States House of Representatives almost immediately passed both a
resolution of disapproval and an appropriations rider prohibiting the use of funds to enforce the
decision.   Legislation has been introduced in both the House and the Senate to reverse Kelo.13
Indeed, the decision seems to have united members of Congress from across the political spectrum,
including, for example, conservative Republican House Majority Leader Tom DeLay to liberal
Democrat Representatives John Conyers and Barney Frank.14
The severity of the reaction is particularly striking because the Court upheld the challenged
government action.  (Moreover, in doing so, the Kelo majority did not even depart from well-
established precedent.)  Virtually all of the Supreme Court constitutional decisions that have
provoked widespread outrage, such as A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States and the series
of cases invalidating New Deal legislation in 1935 and 1936, Brown v. Board of Education and
subsequent school desegregation cases, Engel v. Vitale, Abingdon School District v. Schempp, and
subsequent school prayer cases, Miranda v. Arizona and other Warren Court criminal procedure
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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rulings, Roe v. Wade, Furman v. Georgia, and Texas v. Johnson, for example, involve invalidation
of government action.  Even more remarkably, the governmental bodies that most benefit from the
discretion reaffirmed by Kelo are not federal agencies, but state and, particularly, local governments,
theoretically the entities most responsive to the citizenry. 
I will not dwell upon the merits of the Kelo decision. I wish to consider whether Congress
can constrain state and local officials’ reliance on eminent domain.  Phrased more provocatively, my
query is whether Congress can legislatively overrule, or at least revise, the conception of the “public
use” requirement embodied in Kelo, and constrain the discretion to which states and localities seem
entitled under the decision.  Grappling with the question will involve assessing the implications of
the Court’s recent judicial supremacy and federalism jurisprudence.   15
Part I of this paper will summarize Kelo and outline the congressional reaction to the
decision.  Part II will explore the potential bases for congressional action, focusing largely on
Congress’ powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the
Spending Clause.  I will conclude that broad action of the kind Congress has begun to consider,
which seeks to prohibit use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment, will fall victim to the
principles of federalism and judicial supremacy.  However, Congress could seek to target specific
problems surrounding the use of eminent domain for economic development, and indeed the use of
eminent domain more generally, and the Court may well uphold such targeted approaches.
PART I: Kelo v. New London and the Congressional Response
A. Kelo v. New London
By 1998, after decades of economic decline, designation by a state agency as a “distressed
city,” and the closure of a military installation in the Fort Trumbull section of the City, New
London’s unemployment rate was nearly twice the State average and its population at the lowest
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art28
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 Id. at 2560-61.17
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level since 1920.  Pfizer Inc., an international pharmaceutical company, announced plans to build
at major facility adjacent to Fort Trumbull.  New London officials, with the assistance of the New
London Development Corporation (“NLDC”), a private non-profit entity, crafted a redevelopment
plan focused on 90 acres in Fort Trumbull.  They designed the project to capitalize on the economic
activity Pfizer’s facility would attract.  Officials anticipated that the redevelopment would create
jobs, generate tax revenue, make the city physically more appealing, and create recreational
opportunities.  The mixed-use development would include a waterfront conference hotel anchoring
a cluster of restaurants and shops.  It would also include a marina, new homes, a museum, and office
space.  The city council authorized submission of the plan to state authorities, which, after evaluating
six alternative proposals, approved it.16
Though most of the land was purchased from willing sellers, Susette Kelo and eight other
property owners refused to sell their property, and the City sought to acquire their property by
eminent domain.  By statute, the State of Connecticut has declared that the taking of land, even
developed land, as a part of an economic development project qualifies as a taking for a “public use.”
Kelo and the other landowners sought to prevent the City from invoking eminent domain, arguing
that the taking of property to further local economic development did not qualify as a “public use.”
The trial court enjoined some of the proposed takings, and permitted others.  The Connecticut
Supreme Court held all of the proposed takings constitutionally permissible.17
The United States Supreme Court affirmed.   Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, noted18
that a city could not use eminent domain, consistent with the Fifth Amendment, to take land in order
to confer a private benefit on a particular private party.  Nor could a locality use a public purpose as
a pretext for such a coerced transfer of property for private gain.  However, the majority noted, the
record contained no evidence of such an illicit purpose, and, indeed, city officials had not adopted
the development plan to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.19
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Though eminent domain could be used to acquire land for use by the general public, Justice
Stevens observed, New London was not planning to open all of the condemned land for use by the
general public, either through public ownership or transfer of the property private entities operating
public accommodations (i.e., businesses open to all for a fee).  Justice Stevens noted that the Court
had long rejected a narrow definition of the term “public use” that would permit use of eminent
domain only when the government would make the acquired land available to the general public.
Rather, he explained, the validity of the City’s invocation of its eminent domain powers turns on
whether its development plan serves a “public purpose,” a concept that has traditionally been defined
“broadly” and reflects the Court’s “longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments” with
respect to such matters.20
In the majority’s view, its eminent domain precedents have recognized that society’s needs
have evolved over time and may vary geographically.  The Court has “wisely eschewed rigid
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what
public needs justify the use of the takings power.”21
While New London’s elected officials were not confronted with blight, like that facing
defendants in Berman v. Parker,  their determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to22
justify a program of economic rejuvenation merited deference.  The majority refused to adopt
plaintiffs’ proposed bright-line rule that would define “public use” to exclude economic development
efforts.  Justice Stevens explained that “promoting economic development is a traditional and long-
accepted function of government” and that the Court could draw no principled distinction between
economic development and other uses recognized as “public” in Berman, Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff,  Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,  and other precedents.  Any blurring of the boundary between23 24
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art28
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takings for public and private purposes was of no concern, and indeed “the government’s pursuit of
a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties.”  Justice Stevens added: “‘[t]he public
end may be as well served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of
government.’”25
The majority also refused to require government officials to establish “reasonable certainty”
that the expected economic benefits from a proposed redevelopment would actually accrue to satisfy
the “public use” requirement.  Quoting Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, Justice Stevens
explained that “‘[e]mpirical debates over the wisdom of takings — no less than debates over the
wisdom of other kinds of socio-economic legislation — are not to be carried on in the federal
courts.’”   And such a rule would create a significant and unwarranted impediment to26
comprehensive redevelopment efforts.27
In the final paragraph of its opinion, the majority acknowledged the hardships that
condemnations may entail even when property owners receive adequate compensation, and
acknowledged the importance of questions raised about the fairness of the measure of “just
compensation.”  It also emphasized each state’s freedom to impose greater restrictions on the power
of eminent domain.  The Court did not suggest that Congress had any role to play in addressing
potential abuses of eminent domain by states and localities.  Finally, the Court acknowledged that
“the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain to promote economic development are certainly
matters of legitimate public debate.”28
Justice Kennedy, writing separately, asserted that a court “applying a rational basis review”
to determine whether a taking satisfied the “public use” requirement should invalidate any taking
that, “by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party with only incidental or
pretextual public benefits.”  He cited Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.  and Department of29
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Agriculture v. Moreno,  two Equal Protection cases, as examples of Supreme Court determination30
that a challenged governmental restriction failed “rational basis” review precisely because the
restriction was primarily intended to disadvantage certain private parties.  Justice Kennedy
admonished courts confronting a plausible claim of impermissible favoritism to treat the claim
seriously and carefully review the record.   In Kelo, he explained, the trial court had conducted just31
such a serious inquiry.  Engaging in a “careful and extensive” inquiry regarding whether the
development plan primarily benefitted the developer, Pfizer, and the businesses that would relocate
in the area, the trial court had heard testimony from government officials and corporate officers and
reviewed documentary evidence of communications between the parties. 
Justice Kennedy noted that a “more stringent” review might be appropriate for categories of
takings involving “private transfers in which the risk of undetected impermissible favoritism of
private parties” is particularly acute.  He refused to speculate about categories of cases that might
warrant more intense judicial scrutiny. However, he underscored several aspects of Kelo that made
departure from the deferential Berman/Midkiff standard of review inappropriate.  First, the taking
occurred in the context of a comprehensive development plan addressing “a serious city-wide
depression.”  Second, the projected economic benefits were more than de minimis.  Third, city
officials did not know the identities of most of the private beneficiaries when they formulated their
redevelopment plan.  Fourth, the City had complied with elaborate procedural requirements,
requirements that, moreover, facilitate judicial review.32
Justice O’Connor, writing for the dissenters, acknowledged that “in certain circumstances
and to meet certain exigencies,” the Court had held the taking of property destined for a private use
satisfied the “public use” requirement.  However, she viewed the majority’s deferential approach,
which in her view permitted any taking of property for private use so long as the new use generated
some benefit to the public, as a complete abdication of the judiciary’s role in scrutinizing
government official’s justifications for taking private property.  Nearly any lawful use of private
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art28
   Id. at 2673, 2675 (O’Connor, J., concurring).33
  Id. at 2674-75 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); accord, id. at 2683-84, 2685-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice34
O’Connor distinguished Berman and Midkiff from the case before the Court, explaining that the taking in those cases
targeted properties that were inflicting affirmative harm, and the takings themselves had served to eliminate that
harm. Id. at 2674-75.
   Id. at 2675-76 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 35
   Id. at 2675-76 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).36
 Id. at 2679, 2681, 2682 (Thomas, J., dissenting).37
-9-
property arguably generates some incidental benefit to the public.   The genesis of this failure to33
enforce the “public use” requirement lay in Berman and Midkiff, where the Court had erred in
equating the concept of “public use,” the limitation on the state’s invocation of eminent domain, with
that of “the police power,” a much broader concept.  34
Justice O’Connor criticized both the majority and Justice Kennedy for failing to give the
lower courts any meaningful direction in seeking to identify impermissible takings designed to
bestow a private benefit.  As she observed, “the trouble with economic takings is that the private
benefit and incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing.”35
Moreover, she said, the majority’s pretext test turned on the motives of state officials, which she
considered a problematic basis for constitutional adjudication.  She queried: “If it is true that
incidental public benefits from a new private use are enough to ensure the ‘public purpose’ in a
taking, why should it matter, as far as the Fifth Amendment is concerned, what inspired the taking
in the first place?”36
Justice Thomas added his own dissent. Arguing that the Court should reconsider its
precedents, he undertook a textual analysis of the Takings Clause and historical examination of
understanding of the term “public use.”  He would have held that government entities could invoke
the power of eminent domain only to acquire property that would be held by the government or made
accessible to the general public as of right.   He also complained that deference to public officials’37
determinations that proposed uses qualified as “public uses” was both inappropriate and inconsistent
with the non-deferential approach the Court takes in reviewing government actions threatening other
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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Bill of Rights protections.   He pointedly noted that poor and minority communities would be those38
most likely suffer displacement under the majority’s ruling — first, land in such communities is
more often underutilized, second, such communities possess the least political power.39
B. The Congressional Response
As noted above, congressional reaction was swift.  It consisted of the House’s resolution
disapproving the decision, the introduction of companion Senate and House bills seeking to limit
federal involvement in economic development projects furthered by the use of eminent domain, and
the enactment of an appropriation rider.
The House Resolution states that the majority opinion in Kelo “renders the public use
provision in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment without meaning,” and “justifies the
forfeiture of private property through eminent domain for the sole benefit of another private person.”
The resolution asserts that the dissenting opinion affirms the principle that the eminent domain
power may be employed only to “compel an individual to forfeit her property for the public’s use,
but not for the benefit of another private person.”  Quoting the dissent, it declares that beneficiaries
of the decision are “‘likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the
political process, including large corporations and development firms.’”  The resolution declares that
“all level of government have a constitutional responsibility and moral obligation” to defend property
rights and that such a duty requires each level of government to “exercise the power of eminent
domain only for the good of public use [sic].”  The Resolution then specifically disapproves of the
majority’s opinion and explicitly endorses the dissenting opinion.40
The resolution expresses the sense of the House that state and local governments use eminent
domain only for purposes that serve the public good, and pay just compensation when they do — any
taking that fails to satisfy those requirements “constitutes an abuse of government power and a
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art28
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usurpation of” individual property rights.   The resolution further declares that eminent domain41
should never be used to advantage one party over another.  It urges state and local governments to
abstain from using Kelo “as a justification to abuse the power of eminent domain,” and expressly
“reserves the right to address through legislation any abuses of eminent domain by State and local
government” occasioned by Kelo.42
The companion House and Senate bills to overturn Kelo, entitled “Protection of Homes,
Small Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2005,” have been introduced by Representative Phil
Gingrey and Senator John Cornyn respectively.    The bills set forth findings that largely criticize43
the majority’s opinion and endorse the dissenters’ views.  The bills do not explicitly invoke any
particular enumerated congressional power.  The bills provide that eminent domain may be used to
acquire property only for “public use” and specify that the term “public use” shall not be construed
to include economic development.  The drafters have left the term “economic development”
undefined.  As Justice Stevens noted in Kelo, a variety of takings, such as those that further
exploitation of a state’s natural resources, might be considered takings in aid of economic
development.   Given the bill’s context, however, courts might well construe any resulting44
legislation as limited to economic revitalization plans for non-blighted areas of the type at issue in
Kelo.   The Act applies to “all exercises of eminent domain power by the Federal Government,” and45
“all exercises of eminent domain power by State and local government through the use of Federal
funds.”   The statute neither explicitly provides a right of action against the federal government nor46
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abrogates state sovereign immunity.  The bills have been referred to committee.47
Representatives Scott Garrett and Mark R. Kennedy, pursing a separate legislative initiative,
proposed a rider to the fiscal year 2006 appropriations bill covering the Departments of
Transportation, Treasury, and Housing and Urban Development.  The House adopted the Rider, and
the appropriations bill is now under Senate consideration.  The Rider bans expenditure of any funds
to enforce the judgment of the Court in Kelo.   Garrett explained that “if a private developer is going48
to push someone off their land, out of their house, and destroy that house or small business, then he
should foot the bill for any infrastructure that he is going to build.”  Thus the rider is designed to
“ensure that the Federal Government does not contribute in any way financially” to such projects.49
The various legislative proposals focus on use of eminent domain by the federal government
and the use of federal funds to support state and local projects made possible by those government’s
use of their powers of eminent domain.  The limitations on the federal government’s use of eminent
domain will likely prove insubstantial — few federal projects are likely to be considered “economic
development projects.”   The limitation on federal funding could prove more significant, but its50
significance is difficult to assess, in part because the breadth of the prohibition is unclear.  The
proposed provisions, the Garrett-Kennedy Rider and the Gingrey-Cornyn bill, may prohibit use of
federal funds only to pay for property acquired for economic development purposes against the
landowner’s will, but allow federal funding of other aspects of the redevelopment project.
Alternatively, the proposed provisions might preclude all federal financial assistance to a project that
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uses land acquired by a state or local use of eminent domain that Congress identifies as improper.
More broadly still, the proposals might ban federal funding for anything related to a project sited in
whole or in part on land acquired from an unwilling landowner for economic development purposes
(such as providing transportation funds for a mass transit station on or near the site of offending
project). 
Moreover, such limitations seem largely incongruent with Congress’s real concerns.  In
particular, Congress views the Court as providing inadequate protection for property rights.   Indeed,51
in Congress’ view, the Court’s ruling reflects a fundamentally flawed conception of citizens’ rights
under the Fifth Amendment.  In addition, members of Congress expressed concern that the ruling
would harm minorities, the poor, and the politically powerless.  Such concerns are not fully
addressed by limiting the federal government’s use of eminent domain nor by limiting federal
funding of state and local projects.  State and local authorities would remain free to take property in
circumstances where individuals’ property rights, at least as conceptualized by Congress, are
violated. 
C.  Congressional Options
Congress could seek to address state and local use of eminent domain in several ways.  It
could: 1) legislate with regard to the measure of compensation due as a result of a “taking,”
2) establish procedures or disclosure requirements for states and localities invoking eminent domain,
3) specify certain rebuttable presumptions, identifying circumstances in which courts should presume
a taking is for private use, and thus impermissible, absent evidence to the contrary, or 4) proscribe
the use of eminent domain in certain circumstances.  I will discuss the first option at length and the
remainder more briefly.
The measure of “just compensation” may not adequately compensate property owners for
their losses and, accordingly, may lead government officials to overuse eminent domain.  Ordinarily,
when it invokes eminent domain, the government has the right to acquire the property for market
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value.   It need not compensate owners for the increase in value expected as a result of the52
government project.   Nor need it compensate individuals for financial losses and hardships other53
than those recognized by the market.   Thus the courts ordinarily do not require the government to54
compensate business owners for the loss of good will or losses from business interruption caused
by the need to relocate following a taking of their business premises.  Nor do the courts require the
government to compensate property owners for the sentimental or subjective value of their property,
the inconvenience of moving, or the cost of finding a comparable property.  And indeed, such
uncompensated costs may be particularly pronounced for homeowners and businesses forced to
relocate from poorer neighborhoods.55
The measure of “just compensation” has importance, because the Taking Clause’s “just
compensation” requirement provides a practical financial constraint on the use of eminent domain.
A government project furthered by the use of eminent domain must be more valuable than the
compensation due in order for the use of eminent domain make economic sense.  If the measure of
“just compensation” understates a takings’s full social cost, relieving the government from paying
some of the costs attendant its taking, the government will sometimes engage in the practice even
when its action’s real social costs exceed its benefits.   A measure of compensation that accurately56
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reflects a taking’s true cost would force governments to properly balance public needs against the
harm to individuals.   At the same time, of course, imposing unrealistically high costs would57
improperly inhibit use of eminent domain, and indeed could, if severe enough, preclude governments
from using such authority altogether.58
Congress might establish minimum requirements for just compensation when property is
acquired for transfer to third parties in connection with a locality’s redevelopment efforts.   In59
particular, Congress could reasonably conclude that private developers should not receive all of the
surplus generated by the redevelopment project, but rather that displaced landowners should share
the surplus.   Thus, for purposes of determining “just compensation” in circumstances involving60
economic redevelopment takings, the valuation of the land might focus on the value of the property
to be condemned in light of the prospect that the redevelopment project will be completed.  Congress
might also require that just compensation for such takings take into account the inconvenience a
reasonable person would suffer in relocating.   Such awards will make the cost of the project more61
representative of the project’s true social costs, while relieving individuals of financial burdens that
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society as a whole should shoulder.   Moreover, it may ameliorate some of the harsh effects of62
redevelopment efforts on residents of neighborhoods targeted for redevelopment, in effect providing
them sufficient compensation to allow them to secure comparable property.63
In addition, the projects constructed for economic development purposes differ from many
traditional government projects sited on land acquired by eminent domain.  Economic development
projects are owned by profit-making entities who expect to make a profit on the projects constructed,
unlike most government projects, which are not owned by such profit-making entities.  While
requiring citizens to subsidize projects, by receiving compensation that does not fully cover the
inconvenience caused by eminent domain, might perhaps be justified as a sacrifice reasonably
demanded of citizens to support non-profit-making government operations (which may be non-
profit-making precisely because the nature of the good or service precludes the market from
producing the optimal amount of such good or service), it seems  unreasonable to demand such
sacrifice for the benefit of a profit-making enterprise.  Profit-making enterprise should be expected
to cover the costs of producing the goods and services they offer, including the cost of displacing
pre-existing landowners.64
The remaining options for congressional action can be discussed more briefly.  Congress
could seek to ensure that eminent domain decisions are made in a transparent and politically-
accountable matter — the second option listed at the start of this section.  To promote transparency
and political accountability, Congress might require that local officials compile a record and set forth
their justifications for concluding that a project will benefit the public as well as a private developer.
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Perhaps it can also require that the decision be made by politically-accountable officials.   Indeed,
in Kelo, Justice Kennedy noted the importance of procedures for determining whether a
redevelopment plan served a public purpose.  He noted that Connecticut’s procedures ensured the
compiling of a record that would facilitate judicial review.
As a third option, Congress might seek to identify particular circumstances in which a taking
is especially likely to have an impermissible private purpose.  For example, local governments’
attempts to condemn extremely small parcels unrelated to any larger redevelopment plan might
warrant heightened scrutiny.  Congress might establish a presumption that a taking has a prohibited
private purpose where one private company will gain possession of all of the land taken by eminent
domain, particularly when that enterprise provides a large part of the employment or tax revenue for
the applicable jurisdiction.  Concerns about local officials’ motives might justify reversing the usual
presumption of validity applicable to invocations of eminent domain.  For example, Congress might
mandate heightened judicial scrutiny when government officials seek to condemn tax-exempt
property.  Such adverse presumptions would be rebuttable.65
Rebuttable presumptions might also be used to address the concerns frequently expressly
about the heightened impact of such condemnations on racial and ethnic minorities.   For example,66
Congress could establish a rebuttable presumption that an economic redevelopment project that had
a disproportionate effect on racial and ethnic minorities, the elderly, or the poor would be presumed
improper unless local officials could make some heightened showing of necessity for the project.
However, given that a large percentage of redevelopment efforts presumably have a disproportionate
impact on such groups, such a rule might make virtually all urban economic development projects
presumptively illegal.  Such an extensive rebuttable presumption might be held to unduly infringe
upon the prerogatives of localities recognized in Kelo.
Congress could embrace a fourth option, precluding states and localities from using eminent
domain altogether in certain limited circumstances.  For example, Congress could preclude the use
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of eminent domain to acquire land to build a stadium primarily for use by a professional sports team.
Or, for example, Congress might preclude the use of eminent domain in connection with an
economic development project, when the land used for the project is solely or predominantly that
of a non-profit institution.  Such a rule would target the concern that local officials employ eminent
domain to replace tax exempt institutions with taxable ones.  Pursuing the fourth option involves
placing the greatest restrictions on state and local powers, and thus carries the greatest risk of
exceeding congressional power.
I do not necessarily suggest that any particular one or more of these ideas is a good one.
However, the discussion above provides a range of options that Congress might consider.  Perhaps
more importantly, for purposes of this paper, these options provide a useful context for assessing the
scope of Congress’ powers to restrict states and localities’ use of eminent domain.
PART II: Congress’ Powers Regarding State and Local Use of Eminent Domain
Legislation restricting state and local use of eminent domain would most likely be premised
on one or more of three Constitutional provisions conferring legislative power on Congress.
Congress could ground such legislation either on the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the Spending Clause.   Both the Enforcement Clause power67
and the Commerce Clause power have been subjected to limitations under the Court’s federalism
cases.  While no federalism challenge to Congress’ invocation of the Spending Clause has succeeded
in the past 65 years, the Court has indicated that principles of federalism limit Congress’ power to
condition federal aid to states upon states’ commitment to take certain actions.   I will discuss each68
of the three sources of potential congressional power in turn.
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A. The Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Congress often has a role in enforcing constitutional rights.  Sometimes it even effectively
defines the substantive scope of a constitutional right by legislating substantive provisions reflecting
its conception of the right.   Congress may provide individuals greater legal protection from the69
federal government than governing judicial doctrine requires.  For example, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (the successor of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1968)  includes provisions that protect citizens against wiretapping that exceed the constitutional70
requirements established by the federal courts.71
Congress may also expand upon judicially-declared constitutional rights by granting citizens
such expanded rights against states and their subdivisions.  It may do so pursuant to its Article I,
Section 8 enumerated powers, like the power to regulate interstate commerce.   However, Congress72
lacks such power when there is a countervailing constitutional restraint,  such as the federalism73
doctrines protecting the states.  Congress possesses enhanced powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Section 1 of the Amendment prohibits the states from “depriv[ing] any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law” and from “deny[ing] to any person within its
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jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  The Amendment’s Enforcement Clause, section 5,
confers upon Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment even when federalism
doctrines would ordinarily bar such actions.   As the Court has explained, the Civil War74
Amendments were specifically designed to expand federal power and intrude upon state
sovereignty.   However, neither section 5 nor any other Civil War Amendment completely abrogates75
certain core federalism principles.76
In the modern era, the scope of congressional power under the Enforcement Clause has been
a matter of intense debate.  Three cases in the 1960's and 1970's show the extent to which the Court
was willing to permit Congress a significant role in the defining constitutional rights.  In South
Carolina v. Katzenbach,  the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, finding that the statute77
lay within the powers of Congress under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment,
guaranteeing the right to vote regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.   The78
Voting Rights Act allowed the Department of Justice officials to preclude the use of literacy tests
in certain jurisdiction and subjected those jurisdictions to a requirement that changes in their voting
rules had to be precleared with the Department of Justice.  Covered jurisdictions were those that used
certain devices to limit the franchise and in which less than 50% of voting age residents were
registered to vote.  The Court explained that Congress’ legislative power pursuant to the Fifteenth
Amendment’s Enforcement Clause extended beyond merely generally forbidding states from
violating the Fifteenth Amendment.  Moreover, Congress need not leave it to the judicial process
to fashion particular remedies for systematic constitutional violations or apply such extraordinary
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remedies to particularly problematic political jurisdictions.   The Court noted that Congress had79
reasonably found that case-by-case adjudication had not eliminated state violations of the Fifteenth
Amendment.   The Supreme Court’s holding, prior to the Voting Rights Act’s passage, that state80
reliance on literacy tests as a voter qualification did not violate the Fifteenth Amendment per se,81
did not preclude Congress from banning the use of such tests in particular jurisdictions.  The
legislative record showed that in most, but not all, jurisdictions the Voting Rights Act subjected to
the potential suspension of literacy tests, the test had been instituted, constructed, and administered
in a disparate fashion to disenfranchise African-Americans.   82
 In Katzenbach v. Morgan,  the Court upheld Congress’ invocation of Section 5 as its source83
of authority to enact a statute requiring states to allow citizens educated in Spanish to vote.  The
Court recognized that part of its limitations in defining the scope of rights in adjudicating
constitutional cases were uniquely judicial, and that the scope of constitutional rights might be
greater than those judicially declared.  In Oregon v. Mitchell,  the Court upheld a statute giving 1884
year olds the right to vote, despite its own precedent suggesting that the Fifteenth Amendment
permitted states latitude in determining the minimum voting age.85
The Rehnquist Court has asserted judicial preeminence with regard to constitutional
interpretation and shown increased solicitude toward federalism.  With regard to the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the nascent doctrines being developed in some earlier cases
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have been limited in City of Boerne v. Flores, Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank, United States v. Morrison, Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,
Dickerson v. United States, and  Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett.   Those86
cases have suggested that Congress may enforce the constitutional standards set by the Court, but
that the Section 5 power does not give Congress the power to change those doctrines.   Thus, in City87
of Boerne, the Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“the RFRA”) because it
gave individuals greater rights against state and local regulation than the Court had held
constitutionally necessary.    Likewise in Morrison, the Court invalidated the Violence Against88
Women Act (“VAWA”), which gave a cause of action to victims of gender-motivated violence,
concluding that it lay beyond Congress’ Section 5 powers to ensure women the “equal protection”
of the laws.  And in Dickerson, the Court held invalid congressional legislation providing for the
admissibility of criminal confessions, as inconsistent with Miranda v. Arizona.  It did so even though
the Miranda Court had adopted the warnings as one of a number of potential prophylactic rules
designed to protect criminal defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights, and had invited Congress to
consider alternative approaches to safeguarding those rights.89
The Court has crafted “congruence” and “proportionality” tests to limit Congress’ exercise
of the Section 5 power.  The Court demands “congruence” between the remedial measures Congress
has adopted and the constitutional violations Congress seeks to address.  The constraints imposed
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 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530-34; see also, id at 534; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81-89; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S.90
at 640, 647-48?; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-74; Lane, 541 U.S. at 531-33.
 538 U.S. 721 (2003).91
For example, the evidence the majority found sufficient to satisfy the congruence and proportionality tests in Tennessee92
v. Lane had been deemed insufficient in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, even though both
cases involved the same statute.  Four of the five Justices who had found the evidence insufficient in Garrett did so Lane.
One of the five found the evidence sufficient and joined the four Justices who had dissented in Garrett.  In Hibbs, only
two of the five Justices that had joined the opinion of the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, Morrison, and Garrett,
Kimel, and Florida Pre-Paid found the evidence of unconstitutional discrimination sufficient — a majority of the five
did not.
  Hibbs , 538 U.S. at 745-54 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see, id, at 749-50.93
See note 86 supra.94
Most of the uses of eminent domain are accomplished not by states, but by localities.  Generally, states delegate
their powers of eminent domain to localities.  In any event, the various federalism doctrines, other than sovereign
immunity, protect localities as well as states.  Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 931 n.15 (1997); see National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855- 856, n. 20,(1976) (overruled on other grounds by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528,(1985)); TRIBE, supra note 8,  917-919. 
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on the states must be “proportional,” that is, sufficiently tailored to qualify as a response to
constitutional violations rather than an attempt to redefine judicially-declared constitutional rights.90
Narrow majorities have sometimes found statutes congruent and proportional, as, in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs  and Tennessee v. Lane, though usually only one or two91
of the Justices who have crafted the tests have been persuaded.    Generally, the dissenters have92
insisted upon quite demanding requirements, such as systematic proof of intentional unconstitutional
discrimination.93
Thus, any congressional attempt to overrule Kelo would not likely succeed.  It seems clear
that the Court would invalidate a statute that simply specified that economic development could
never qualify as a “public use.”  This would, in effect, change the right Congress purports to protect
against state encroachment.   However, a more focused approach designed to address specific94
abuses of the eminent domain power in the service of economic development may well lay within
Congress’ Section 5 power. 
1. The Comparative Role of Congress and the Courts
The Court often cannot construct a rule that is perfectly coterminous with the scope of a
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  Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 68, at 202 n.29 (collecting sources); see, id. at 202-04.  Indeed, rules are95
inherently either over-inclusive or under-inclusive in relation to their purposes.  See Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The
Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards Dilemma and the Line Item Veto, 44 VILLANOVA L. REV. 189, 199-200
(1999)(hereinafter “Dead Again”).  Only an ad hoc standard can be coterminous with the constitutional interests it
protects.  Such standards, unfortunately, almost invariably produce unpredictable and inconsistent results.  Id. at 200-201;
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justice of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,  62-63 (1992).  Moreover,
because the Supreme Court takes so few cases, it will have difficulty policing the lower courts’ application of the
standard.  See generally, Peter L. Strauss, One-Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM . L. REV. 1093 (1987) (discussing implication of the
court’s limited docket on substantive doctrines involving judicial review of agency decisions).
 Brief for the United States at 44-47 Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No 99-5525)(reprinted at 2000 WL96
141075). Scalia took aim at this approach, at least when the Court applied its prophylactic rules to states in his dissent
in Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. at 457-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
  Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 68, at 202 n.29 (collecting sources); see, id. at 202-04; Michael McConnell,97
Comment: Institution and Interpretations: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997).
 Indeed, the Court has largely embraced such an approach in its equal protection jurisprudence, as captured by the first98
prong of the Carolene Products approach.  U.S. v. Carolene Prods, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see generally, JOHN
HART ELY , DEM OCRACY AND ITS D ISCONTENTS: A  THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW  (1980); Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949); Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 68, at 217-21.
 See, Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 445-46 (1991); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner99
of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).  As the Court explained in Minneapolis Star & Tribune, “when the state singles out
the press . . . the political constraints that prevent a legislature from passing crippling taxes of general applicability are
weakened, and the threat of burdensome taxes are acute.”  Id.  Note that the Court does not limit singling out the press
or some elements of the press for especially favorable treatment.  See generally, Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering and
the First Amendment, 53 COMM UN . L.J. 191, 227-28 (2001).
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constitutional right.   Sometimes, perhaps controversially, the Court will specify a prophylactic rule95
that sweeps more broadly than the constitutional right.   At other times the court concludes, for96
institutional reasons, that it cannot judicially enforce a constitutional provision.   Sometimes it does97
little more.  At other times, however, it specifies procedures designed to ensure that decision-makers
adequately take constitutional considerations into account.   For example, the Court has refused to98
hold that the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses immunize media entities from taxation, however
it requires that any taxes on media entities be ones of general applicability.  The Court has justified
this non-discrimination rule, at least in part, as a means to ensure that the political branches of
government, primarily at the state and local level, do not infringe upon press rights, absent some
substantial justification.99
The Court has also outlined procedures for government institutions, even local government
institutions, of which it is particularly suspicious.  Consider the restrictions the Supreme Court has
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380 U.S. 51 (1965).100
Id. at 58-59 (“Because the censor's business is to censor, there inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive101
than a court--part of an independent branch of government--to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression”).
Id. at 58-59.  In particular, under Freedman, any system of prior restraints must: 1) afford a prompt hearing to the102
person whose communication is at issue, 2) require the state to shoulder the burden of showing that the material is
obscene, 3) defer the imposition of a valid final restraint on the material until a judicial proceeding is commenced and
completed, and 4) require the state to seek affirmation of its initial finding of obscenity. See id. at 58-59; NOW AK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 7, at § 16.61(c), at 1207-08.
  426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 732, 740 (1971) (Pentagon Papers103
case)(White, J., concurring).  See generally, Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 68, at  217-20.
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imposed upon state and local censorship of obscenity.  In Freedman v. Maryland,  the Court100
outlined concerns about censors’ lack of objectivity.  Such censors might err on the side of
prohibiting constitutionally protected speech in order to justify their existence.  Moreover, if the state
or locality make securing judicial review unduly onerous, a censor’s decision might in practical
effect be final.   In light of these structural concerns, the Court designed requirements that had to101
be met by local censorship regimes.102
Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong provides another example of the Court’s crafting of structural
protections where it could not, for institutional reasons, engage in rigorous substantive review.
There, the Court specified that certain decisions rife with constitutional implications be made at the
highest levels of government to ensure that the decisions were made by officials sensitive to the
constitutional interests.  The Court held that a Civil Service Commission regulation barring aliens
from federal employment violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.   The Court103
acknowledged the government’s broad powers over immigration, and the concomitant limited
judicial review of constraints on aliens, and noted that the Civil Service Commission had presented
justifications that could support such a rule.  Ordinarily, then, under a “rational basis” analysis, the
Court would have upheld regulation.  However, the Court concluded that only the President or
Congress could invoke the interests used to justify the regulation — since the aliens had been
admitted into the country pursuant to congressional and presidential decisions, due process required
that decisions to deprive such aliens of an important liberty interest, i.e. working for the federal
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 Hampton v. Mow Sung Wong, 425 U.S. at 116.  Or, if the Commission is to impose such a restriction, it must defend104
it based on considerations that are properly the concern of the Commission.
 Pub. L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48.105
 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 458-59; Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. at  921; Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and Stave106
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM . L. REV.  847, 855-57 (1979).  
 FEDERALIST No. 28 at 181 (Hamilton)(Clinton Rossiter ed.).107
  See, Lynch v. Household Finance Corp, 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (right to enjoy property is an important personal108
right) Indeed, in his path-breaking article entitled the New Property, Charles Reich argued that a property interest should
be recognized in government licenses, government grants, and government employment because having a property right
in such essentials was crucial to an independent citizenry.   Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964); id. at 756-60, 768-71, 771-74 (discussing the relationship between property and liberty).
  See Zygmunt J.B. Plater & William Lund Norine, Through the Looking Glass of Eminent Domain: Exploring the109
"Arbitrary and Capricious" Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental Decisions, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 661, 663-64 (1989) ("Eminent Domain condemnation represents one of the legal system's most drastic non-penal
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government, be made at a comparable level of government.104
Congress can undoubtedly conclude that political safeguards do not adequately protect state
prerogatives or individual rights from federal encroachment, and enhance those safeguards.  For
instance, Congress has acted on such a conclusion with regard to its own procedures, as exemplified
by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.   Congress should also possess the authority to105
assess whether political safeguards fail to adequately prevent state and local governments from
encroaching upon citizens’ federal constitutional rights, and take action if it judges those safeguards
inadequate.  Indeed, federalism, like the separation of powers, creates a tension between
governmental actors that protects individual liberty.   While recently scholars and jurists have106
focused on the states’ role in protecting individual liberty from federal encroachment, the reverse
is also true.  As Alexander Hamilton observed: “Power being almost always the rival of power, the
general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpation of the state governments.”107
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause plays a critical role in the system of checks and
balances that shape federal-state relations, explicitly empowering Congress to act when
constitutional rights are jeopardized by state and local governments. 
State and local governments’ exercise of eminent domain implicates the right to own
property,  including the right to prevent government expropriation of that property for the private108
benefit of another.   The Kelo majority, and in particular Justice Kennedy, as well as the dissenters,109
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incursions into the rights of individuals ...."); James W. Ely, Jr., Can the “Despotic Power” Be Tamed, 17 PROBATE AND
PROPERTY 31, 31 (Dec. 2003)(“eminent domain is one of the most intrusive powers of government. It requires that
individual owners relinquish their property without their consent”).
 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2661; id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 110
 Indeed, William Treanor argues that the Just Compensation requirement itself was a procedural protection designed111
to constrain government choice in exercising its power of eminent domain.  Treanor, supra note 70, at 827, 829-30, 832,
834, 854, 860.  Saul Levmore has also made an argument about the structural aspect of Just Compensation.  Saul
Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 306-08 (1990).
 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 1661; id., at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).112
  See, Jennifer Maude Klemetsrude, The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 75 NORTH DAKOTA L.113
REV. 783, 812 (1999)
 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2675-76 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 114
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acknowledged the existence of such a constitutionally-protected right.110
However, the Court appears unable to vindicate such constitutionality protected rights due
to institutional concerns, namely the difficulty of formulating a judicially-administrable test that does
not arrogate to courts decisions about the role of government in society and the interrelationship
between the public and the private, issues that, in a democracy, the political branches of government
should resolve.   The Justices agreed that the government cannot take property from one citizen and111
transfer it to another solely to advantage that other person,  but how is the Court to enforce this112
limitation?  The Court could either impose its conception of the legitimate ends of government on
state and local officials, review local government decision-making to identify the presence of an
illicit private purpose, or place somewhat arbitrary limits on the government’s power to invoke
eminent domain.113
The first option is problematic and promises a return to Lochner-Era jurisprudence.  Public
use, at least if defined in terms of benefits sought rather than the types of uses to which the property
is put, requires the Court to categorize governmental purposes as “public” or “private” in a context
where public and private interests are inextricably intertwined.   Indeed, to the extent that interest114
group theory has succeeded in convincing us that polities really consist of interest groups, some large
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 Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-18 (1984); Jonathan115
R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM . L. REV. 223, 232 (1986).  See also, Richard Fallon, What is Republicanism and Is It Worth Saving?, 102 HARV.
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 See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 837.  And indeed, if public interest theory is correct most legislation is private-regarding,116
pushed by narrow concentrated groups for their own interest and disadvantaging diffuse majorities, even if the narrow
interest groups claim that their interest is the public interest, as they generally do.  Macey, supra note 114; Easterbrook.,
supra note 114. 
 Even the case in which a federal district court found a pretextual public purpose used to justify a taking for private117
purposes, the government officials made a plausible argument that helping the company was for the benefit of the larger
community.  99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal 2001).
Local officials asserted that if they did not condemn plaintiffs property to transfer it to Costco, Costco would relocate
and the surrounding businesses would fail, ultimately resulting in the area becoming blighted.  Id.  The Court was able
to reject the argument on a statutory ground, that the California Constitution did not permit condemnation to forestall
prospective blight.
Another example is the private necessity defense, allowing a private citizen to use private property to avoid
physical injury of even significant property damage.  Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908); Vincent v. Lake
Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 107 (2000).  In this
context, generally providing for persons who might suffer significant property loss is viewed as a public purpose,
otherwise such a doctrine might raise a significant problem with regard to whether the taking constituted “public use.”
Citizens Sav. & Loan v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874);Walton v. Edmonds, 106 N.E. 41 (1914); Ferrie v. Sweeney, 72118
N.E.2d 128 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1946); Stanley v. Department of Conservation & Development, 199 S.E.2d 641
(N.C. 1973)(criticized in Madison Cable v. City of Morgantown, 325 N.C. 634, 647, 386 S.E.2d 200, 207-08 (1989).
Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1 (Maine 1983)(rejecting attack); see generally, W ILLIAM D. POPKIN , MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1057-58 & 1063-64 (4th ed. 2005).
 2A NICHOLS ON EM INENT DOM AIN , supra note 2, § 7.02[1](noting that several jurisdictions have concluded that the119
task is impracticable); Brown v. Gerlad, 100 Me. 351, 61 A. 785 (‘The term public use is difficult of exact definition
and most courts have avoided giving one . . . In an inevitably changing world an attempt to do so would be unwise, if
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and diffuse and others small and concentrated, competing to secure government action,  we might115
question whether any significant public interest exists independent of private interests.   So, for116
example, even when government actions is meant to benefit specific individuals, one might easily
view the action as one that provides a public benefit.   Efforts to distinguish public and private117
benefits for purposes of constitutional analysis have led courts, on both the federal and state level,
to invalidate salutary social programs, like day care programs for working mothers, and other
salutary efforts, like financially assisting an industry’s pollution control initiatives, on grounds that
they serve a “private” purpose.   In eminent domain in particular, the efforts of state courts to118
develop a concise definition of public use that distinguishes between permissible and impermissible
has hardly been a success.119
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of condemnation laws is not susceptible of precise definition”); 2A NICHOLS ON EM INENT DOM AIN , supra note 2, §
7.02[7] at 7-37.
 Formidable evidentiary difficulties are presented by purpose test, Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and120
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 M ICH . L. REV. 266, 284-90 (1987).
 Kelo, 125 S.Ct. 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).121
 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword, Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 95 (1997).122
 Race and the Prosecutor’s Charging Decision, 101 HARV L. REV. 1520, 1557 (1988); N. Douglas Wells, Prosecution123
as an Administrative System: Some Fairness Concerns, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 841, 843 (1990); Note, Constitutional Risks
to Equal Protect in the Criminal Justice System, 114 HARV. L. REV.  2098, 2108 (2001); see RANDALL KENNEDY , RACE,
CRIM E AND THE LAW  354 (1997)(stating the research had uncovered no cases in which a court has ruled that a prosecutor
has abused his charging discretion on grounds of racial discrimination).
  ELY , supra note 97, at 136-45 (finding such tests useful).124
  Most often, state constitutions will list certain uses that benefit private parties as permissible, either by declaring them125
“public uses” or by allowing use of eminent domain for specified “private” uses.  See, NICHOLS ON EM INENT DOM AIN ,
supra note 2, at §§ 7.03[10][c].
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The second option, which the Kelo majority appears to have chosen, focuses on public
officials’ subjective motives.   Justice O’Connor’s accusation that both the majority and Justice120
Kennedy offer the lower courts little guidance in identifying illicitly-motivated invocations of
eminent domain is surely well-taken.   And indeed, motive tests, such as that adopted by the121
majority, have often proven anemic and provided citizens with at best illusory protection against
government officials.   Thus, for example, even though criminal defendants can defend themselves122
by alleging discriminatory prosecution, the presence of a motive test in a context where the
government decision-maker customarily enjoys a great deal of discretion, means that very few
discriminatory prosecution claims succeed.   As I suggest below, such tests confront the courts with123
numerous difficulties.124
Third, one might limit the government’s invocation of eminent domain to preclude use in
certain circumstances even if it furthers the public interest in important, or even essential ways.125
Thus, Justice Thomas would construe the “public use” requirement as permitting government
acquisition of land only when the government will retain ownership or when the land, though owned
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takings that fall within the definition of “public use.” 2A NICHOLS ON EM INENT DOM AIN , supra note 2,  at §§ 7.03[10][c].
  2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOM AIN , supra note 2,  at §§ 7.02[2], 7.02[3], at 7-29, 7.02[5].127
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 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427-30 (1982)(“More recent cases confirm the129
distinction between a permanent physical occupation, a physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that
merely restricts the use of property”); id. at 435 (explaining normative attraction of physical appropriation rule).  Granted
this distinction has been criticized.  EPSTEIN , supra note 4, at 93-104; Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1101-
05 (1983).  For a discussion of the narrow circumstances under which a court may find a regulatory taking, see Lingle
v. Chevron USA Inc., — U.S. —, 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2081-82 (2005)(four exceptions).
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by a private entity, is accessible to all citizens (for free or on a fee-paid basis).   The theory has a126
rich heritage, but most courts have found it unduly restrictive.   Moreover, arguably even that test127
allows for takings that benefit a narrow range of private individuals.  A general right of access
possessed by all citizens may mean little if only few have an interest in access.  The power to charge
for access may also limit access to a narrow class as a practical matter.  An expensive marina may
nominally be available to all, yet, in reality, benefit only a narrow segment of the public who have
the financial resources and interest to take advantage of the marina.
Thus, Congress can perhaps play a role in protecting property rights against state and local
governments’ use of their eminent domain powers.  Skeptics may argue that allowing Congress to
vindicate property rights, under authority granted by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement
Clause, would expand congressional power over the states beyond all means of constraint.  After all,
the limitations imposed on state legislatures by the Court in the name of protecting private property
allowed the Court to severely hamper state regulation in the Lochner Era.   However, the Court128
could distinguish a congressional power to vindicate citizen’s right to title in and physical possession
of property from a broader and more dangerous congressional authority to protect property owners
from state and local regulations that limit their use of property.
The distinction between depriving an owner of title or physical dominion over property and
subjecting the property to regulation underlies the Court’s jurisprudence — a physical invasion
(much less formal assumption of title) is virtually always a “taking,” enacting a regulation rarely
constitutes a “taking.”   As the Court explained in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,129
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 Though the protection extends beyond physical takings, a landowners right to compensation arguably extends only130
to regulations that courts consider functionally equivalent to government acquisitions. Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice
and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMM ENTARY 279, 304 (1992); Levmore, supra note 110, at  320 (“One might simply
say that joined to the core of physical takings are cases in which the government sought to elevate form over substance
in order to avoid compensating those burdened by its actions.”).  See generally, FISCHEL, supra note 56, at 334-35.
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-38; accord, Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,  535 U.S.131
at 323-24 & n.19.  In Loretto, the Court explained that a physical taking precludes the power to exclude, the most
treasured right in the bundle.  It forever denies the owner use of the property.  It empties the right to transfer of any value.
 These are magnified by also taking title to property. 
Of course the case involved a requirement of access to a cable company, and the Court did not assert that a
physical invasion was a necessary element of a takings claim.  And indeed, Jed  Rubenfeld argues that the Court cannot
consistently sustain the position that physical invasion is a sufficient condition for a taking.  see Rubenfeld, Usings, supra
note 128, at 1101-05; see, Treanor, supra note 70, at  811-12 (discussing current scholarly attacks on the “physicalist”
conception of property).  Though, of course, taking title is even more invasive and may be distinguishable from physical
invasion.  Accordingly, even Rubenfeld’s critique does not undermine the effort to distinguish regulating property from
taking title to that property.
 Treanor, supra note 70, at 791-92; id., at  838-39 (discussing Madison’s views); id. at 794-95 (discussing early132
Supreme Court Cases); The Legal Tender Cases, 71 U.S. 551-52 (1871) (“The Takings Clause has always been
understood as referring to direct appropriation and not to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful
power”); Levmore, supra note 110, at 319. 
 Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 17; Colo. Const. art. 2, § 14; Mo. Const. art. 1 § 28, Wash Const. art 1, § 16; see, 2A NICHOLS133
ON EM INENT DOM AIN ,  supra note 2, § 7.03[11][c].
 See, Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 68, at 232.  See also, id. at 236, 244 (localities closer to problems).134
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J. 1196, 1210-11 (1977)(discussion of four advantages of states — greater accuracy,
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a physical taking is “the most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests,”  destroying130
each of the rights associated with property ownership.    Indeed, both the Court and scholars note131
that the distinction underlay the Framer’s conception of a “taking.”   Several state constitutions132
suggest the unique nature of eminent domain by specifying that the courts must determine whether
an asserted public use is actually public, without giving any deference to legislative determinations
that the use qualifies as a “public use.”133
Moreover, there is reason to believe that individual rights need protection in this sphere.  On
the most basic level, the large number of economic development takings might give rise to some
skepticism about the legitimacy of the justification for those takings.  In addition, local governments
may be particularly likely to abuse their eminent domain powers.  Many argue that local government
is more representative than the national government, because local government offers citizens a more
active role in government affairs.   Of course this very majoritarian responsiveness may place134
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 Bell, The Madisonian Vision, supra note 68, at 234 & nn. 229-231.  Indeed, the Court much more frequently135
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See generally, Merrill, supra note 1, at 115; Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls
as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 853-57 (1983);  Treanor, supra note 70, at 843-44, 867;
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BERLINER, supra note 4, at 130 (casinos are big winners in condemnation because they bring the prospect of so much137
tax revenue); Fasano v. Bd. Of County Comm’rs, 264 Or. 547, 507 P.2d 23 (1973); KOM ESAR, supra note 127, at 56-59
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   Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321, 1321 (9th Cir. 1996); NAACP Br. at 29 n.35; Audrey F. McFarlane,138
Local Economic Development Incentives in an Era of Globalization: The Exploitation of Decentralization and Mobility,
35 URB. LAW . 305, passim (2003) (also discussing that there is little accountability to general public for such decisions).
Indeed, to the extent that the Republican Form of Government Clause is to guarantee public control of
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federal constitutionally-based interests in jeopardy.   More importantly, however, smaller units of135
government may more often be dominated by special financial interests, whose continued health and
presence in the community are critical to the community and to its tax base.   James Madison’s
writings reflect precisely these sorts of concerns — his most widely-recognized expression of these
concerns is Federalist Number 10.136
But there is particular reason for concern with regard to economic interests’ undue influence
on local decision-making pertaining to the use of eminent domain.  In an era of tax aversion and a
demand for government services, revenue-producing businesses may be critical to local political
leaders.  Indeed, the revenue provided by a commercial enterprise may have even greater significance
than the votes of citizens adversely affected by an invocation of eminent domain. The criticisms of
the use of eminent domain for economic development trace excessive and oppressive use of the
practice to localities’ hunger for tax revenues and the undue influence large commercial enterprises
gain as a result.137
Moreover, some takings may take place in circumstances where there is limited
transparency.   Sometimes the motives of accountable local officeholders may be shrouded in138
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government, Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for A Third Century, 88
COLUM  L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1988)(discussing Framers’ views); TRIBE, supra note 8, at 908-10, that Clause itself might
warrant intervention to ensure the transparency of local procedures for invoking eminent domain.
 NAACP Br. at 29 n.35 (“the delegation of the eminent domain power does not end at local governments, who are139
accountable to the public in at least some minimal way. The authority is commonly delegated to utilities, redevelopment
agencies and the like”); McFarlane, supra note 137, at 314-15.  See generally,  FISCHEL, supra note 56, at 330-31, 367
(suggesting greater scrutiny for administrative agencies in part because they are not subject to pluralist interest group
pressures).
 McFarlane, supra note 137, at 314-15.140
 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736 (upholding statute because Congress reasonably concluded that gender-based stereotypes141
regarding the respective familial responsibilities of men and women “lead to subtle discrimination [by employers] that
may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis”).
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secrecy.  Sometimes the entities making decisions are not accountable to the electorate.   As one139
commentator has explained:
“The problem is also lack of public accountability. Economic
development is carried out through a set of privatized structures and
processes designed primarily, if not exclusively, to meet the needs of
business elites and encourage capital investment in particular
geographic areas to promote growth and increase in land prices and
rents. That process is designed to be quickly responsive, private, and
shielded from public scrutiny. This is accomplished through elites
wielding informal channels of power as well as quasi-private
government entities such as public authorities that operate free from
public scrutiny.”  140
The Fourteenth Amendment should be viewed as conferring upon Congress the legislative
authority to vindicate the interest in property protected by the Takings Clause.  As with gender
stereotypes that Congress sought to address in the Family and Medical Leave Act, the illicit conduct
targeted here, abuse of eminent domain to advantage private parties rather than further public goals,
may be too subtle to detect on a case-by-case basis.  That was the Court’s rationale in upholding the
Family and Medical Leave Act as permissible prophylactic legislation designed to secure equal
protection of the laws.   Analogously, in the context of First Amendment challenges to campaign141
finance regulation, the Court has also allowed broad prophylactic legislation regulating campaign
contributions because illicit quid pro quo deals between officeholders, political parties, and
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 In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003), the Court said that Congress could142
be concerned about the prospect the officeholders would decide issues according to contributor’s wishes rather than on
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contributors are too subtle for case-by-case identification.   And indeed, recall that the Supreme142
Court upheld the Voting Rights Act because case-by-case adjudication had proven inadequate to the
task of protecting African-Americans’ right to vote.  The existence of such congressional authority
nevertheless leaves a significant, and perhaps preeminent, role for the Judiciary.  The Judiciary must
consider whether the congressionally-prescribed prophylactic rules are reasonable limitations on state
and local government’s use of eminent domain in light of the threat to individual property rights. 
Let us consider two types of potential congressional action: modifying the measure of “just
compensation” in economic development cases and specifying certain presumptions with regard to
the validity of official’s invocation of eminent domain.  Modification of the measure of “just
compensation” can be justified as a means of addressing the judiciary’s institutional inadequacies
as a protector of property rights against invocations of eminent domain.  Such an approach might
then diminish the importance of judicial inquiries into the purposes of takings, by creating incentives
for public officials and the citizenry they represent to balance the need for a taking and the true harm
caused by the taking.   Modifying the measure of “just compensation” makes the political branches143
of government more sensitive to constitutional consideration, just as the requirement for generality
makes taxing officials sensitive to the burden of taxes on media entities.  Thus, state and local
officials are less likely to abuse the power of eminent domain because using eminent domain will
become more costly, at least to the extent it is used in furtherance of economic redevelopment.
Legislation specifying certain presumptions of invalidity for invocations of eminent domain
in particular circumstances could perhaps be justified as prophylactic legislation designed to ensure
the rights of property owners protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.   Indeed, Justice Kennedy,
in his separate concurrence, suggests that the Court will need to develop some guidelines, perhaps
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 Fallon, supra note 121, at 95 (“In light of history and familiar psychology, however, some types of actions--as144
identified either by their contents or their effects--can be seen in the aggregate as likely to reflect forbidden purposes.
When this is so, a sensible doctrinal response is to elevate the applicable level of scrutiny.”)
  Such an approach does not resurrect the discredited irrebuttable presumptions doctrine, see, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline,145
412 U.S. 441 (1973); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFluer, 441 U.S. 632 (1974); Dept of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S.
508 (1973), which has now largely been abandoned.  See generally, Bell, Dead Again, supra note 94, at 203-04.  While
legislative power should ordinarily not be subject to an equal protection challenge when it chooses to create an
irrebuttable as opposed to a rebuttable presumption, the distinction may have relevance when Congress seeks to legislate
in way that limit state exercise of constitutionally protected sovereign powers.
  See, Brief for the United States at 44-47 Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No 99-5525)(reprinted at 2000 WL146
141075)(outlining several judicially created prophylactic rules of constitutional law).  Such rules presume that if the
criteria triggering the rule is met, the conduct is unconstitutional, and offer government officials no opportunity to
demonstrate that their actions are consistent with the underlying constitutional concerns, and thus should be permissible.
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in the form of rebuttable or irrebuatable presumptions,  if the public use requirement is to serve as144
a real constraint on state and local officials.  He laid out some concerns, but suggested that his
concerns by no means exhausted the issues.  Justice Stevens’ majority opinion also suggests that the
majority might consider whether the presumption of regularity is warranted when a taking is not
related to a comprehensive development plan.
Rebuttable presumptions would clearly more likely pass constitutional muster than
irrebuttable ones.   Thus, perhaps Congress can establish rebuttable presumptions that takings in
certain circumstances are for private purposes, but may not establish irrebuttable presumptions, such
as a presumption that no taking for economic purpose can be found a taking for “public use.”145
Indeed, rebuttable presumptions are likely to be less intrusive than the standard judicial response to
circumstances in which case-by-case adjudication fails to safeguard individual rights, promulgation
of a prophylactic rule.  Such rules, like the rule regarding custodial interrogation set forth in Miranda
v. Arizona, operate in large part as irrebuttable presumptions, sweeping within them more conduct
than that which actually offends the relevant constitutional interests.146
Congress might also focus legislation on protecting constitutional rights, other than the right
to property, threatened by state and local use of eminent domain.  Two such independent
constitutional interests have been discussed in connection with the use of eminent domain for
economic development: ensuring the free exercise of religion and preventing the denial of equal
protection to racial groups or other“discrete and insular” minorities.  With regard to the first, some
have argued that local officials are especially likely to target buildings owned by religious
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point out that the property that is probably the most at risk under the Kelo case is that which belongs to our religious
institutions and other organizations that have been granted tax exempt status pursuant to State law. ”); 151 CONG. REC.
H5584 (Statement of Representative Tiahrt); David D. Kirpatrick, Ruling on Property Seizure Rallies Christian Groups,
N.Y. T IM ES A13 (July 11, 2005).
  For an argument for special protection for First Amendment uses see Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First148
Amendment Land Uses, 69 MO . L. REV. 653 (2004).
  The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) Pub. L. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§2000cc to 200cc-5), may obviate the need for any additional protection for religious institutions.
The Act provides that no government shall impose a land use regulation that substantially burdens religious practice or
a religious institution unless the government establishes a compelling interest for doing so and the regulation is the least
restrictive means for furthering that government interest.  The subsection applies whenever the activity imposing the
burden is federally funded or effects interstate commerce or involves individualized assessments of prospective land uses.
More generally, it precludes all governments from imposing or implementing land use regulations in a way that
discriminates against religious institutions or excludes religious institutions from the jurisdiction.  42 U.S.C. §2000cc.
 125 S.Ct. at 2677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 2686-87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). BERLINER, supra note 4, at 102;149
151 CONG. RECORD H5581 (statement of Representatives Frank, etc.).  Amicus like the NAACP did so as well.
 See, H. Res. 304; S. 1313; H.R. 3083; Nader & Hirsch, supra note 4; 151 CONG. REC.  H5505 (statement of Rep.150
Kennedy); 151 CONG. REC.  H5580 (statement of Representative Barney Frank); GREENHUT, supra note 4, at 113-120.
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institutions for redevelopment, because such property is tax exempt.  Local officials allegedly seek
to replace religious institutions with owners, either commercial entities or residential property
owners, that will produce the tax revenue needed to fund government activities.   The Fourteenth147
Amendment should authorize Congress to craft legislation providing focused protection to tax-
exempt religious or other charitable institutions against state and local use of eminent domain.148
The Kelo dissenters voiced concern about the disproportionate impact of economic
development projects accomplished by eminent domain on “discrete and insular minorities.”149
Justice Thomas in particular discussed at some length the effect the Urban Renewal program’s
displacement of African-American communities.  The destruction of Poletown, an ethnic
neighborhood in Detroit, Michigan for the construction of a General Motors plant provides another
widely-known notorious example of the deleterious effects takings by local authorities can have on
racial and ethnic communities that lack political power.  Others have expressed such concerns about
the use of eminent domain for economic development.   While the dissenters sought to address150
these concerns by wholesale prohibition on economic redevelopment, such concerns could also be
addressed by means of heightened review upon redevelopment efforts that have a disproportionate
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“discrete and insular” minorities) ; Nader & Hirsch, supra note 4, at 224-31 (proposing strict scrutiny of invocations of
eminent domain where takings cause significant costs, not reflected in the award of just compensation, primarily upon
the politically powerless.
 See, Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 (“The first step in applying these now familiar principles [of congruence and152
proportionality] is to identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.”).
 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531 (unfavorable treatment insufficient, it has to be motivated by religious animus); see153
generally, Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368
 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 90; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.154
-37-
effect on racial, ethnic, or other “discrete and insular” minorities within the community.151
2.  Congruence and Proportionality
Congruence and proportionality depend upon the existence of established constitutional
doctrines that define constitutionally-impermissible state and local actions.  Even where such152
established doctrines exist, Congress will possess very limited Section 5 power if the established
constitutional tests are ones primarily designed to make government actions practically
unreviewable.
The congruence and proportionality tests seek to distinguish mere harm to a group or interest
as a result of state or local action, from harm to the group or interest at the hands of state or local
governments that constitute a constitutional transgression.   Thus, in justifying legislative action,153
Congress must do more than show, for example, that the elderly or the handicapped have received
unfavorable treatment at the hands of state officials, Congress must show that such unfavorable
treatment amounts to constitutionally-prohibited discrimination.   Proportionality is then assessed154
relative to the extent of the violations Congress identifies.  The established congruence and
proportionality tests provide Congress substantial authority with regard to state and local actions that
harm racial groups, for example, where clear constitutional standards designed to eliminate
consideration of race (at least in ways that harms members of racial minorities) exist.  The
congruence and proportionality tests provide much less robust authority for Congress to attack state
classifications subject only to “rational basis” review, a form of judicial review designed largely to
immunize government action from meaningful constitutional scrutiny (often due to judiciary’s
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 Gerald Gunther, In Search for an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,155
64 HARV. L. REV.  1, 8 (1972) (rational basis means minimal scrutiny with none in fact)
  In his  Morrison dissent, Justice Souter argued that defendants could establish the constitutionality of the violence156
Against Women Act merely by showing that there had been significant violence against women before the statute was
enacted, and that defendants need not show that such violence was unconstitutional as gender-motivated violence,
because the Court had not even sufficiently set forth substantive doctrines defining the concept of  “gender–motivated”
was. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 629 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting).
 In re Opinion of the Justices, 356 Mass. 775, 796, 250 N.E.2d 547, 558 (1969); 2A NICHOLS ON EM INENT DOM AIN ,157
supra note 2, at § 7.02[4].
 Kelo, S.Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J.,  concurring) (“A court applying rational-basis review under the Public Use Clause158
should strike down a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular private party, with only incidental
or pretextual public benefits”);  id., at 2661(Stevens, J))(“the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners'
land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party . . .Nor would the City be allowed to take
property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit”); id. at
2675-76 (O’Connor, J.) (asserting, without protest from Justices Kennedy and Stevens that the majority has adopted a
motive test).
In discussing pretext, the court might have been referring to the district court’s analysis in 99 Cent Only Stores
v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001)(commercial property condemned
only because Costco asserted that it would leave the community if the land were not condemned and alternatives were
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concerns about its own institutional limitations).155
The congruence and proportionality tests may fail to provide Congress with appropriate
authority to constrain state conduct when judicial doctrines defining constitutional violations either
have not been established or are in flux.  When courts have not determined the types of conduct that
violate the Constitution, it is difficult to assess any congressional constraints on state and local
officials in relation to the state and local actions courts would recognize as constitutional
violations.   The Court has not clearly defined the standard for finding a taking to be for a private,156
rather than a public, use, or, at least, the doctrine is now in flux.  The Court appears to be working
its way toward determining what purposes are illicit in the context of state and local invocations of
eminent domain.  At this point, several questions remain unanswered or at least subject to some
doubt.
In considering challenges to state and local official’s power to take property, the Judiciary
could adopt an objective analysis, focusing on the effect of the taking, or a subjective analysis,
focusing on the relevant decision-makers’ subjective states of mind.  Though many state doctrines
defining “public use” seem to focus on the effect of the taking rather than the subjective motivations
of decision makers,  the Supreme Court appears to have opted for the subjective approach.157 158
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(9th Cir. 1996).
  See Mount Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977 ); accord, Bd. of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871159
n.22 (1982); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21 (1977).
 These options are phrased in terms of a subjective test, but an analogous range of choices exist if the Court ultimately160
adopts an objective standard. An objective test might examine who gains from the project, the government or the
community as a whole or a few narrow interests.  In focusing on the actual project advantages, the court could use any
of the five following alternatives as the standard.  Must the project merely produce some public benefit, a substantial
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Whether the Court continues to embrace a subjective approach or opts for an objective one,
it will have to distinguish “public” purposes from “private” ones and determine the degree of public
purpose sufficient to satisfy the “public use” requirement.  The Court will have to identify purposes
as public or private.  For example, it will have to decide whether providing land to a major local
employer to expand its operations is a “public” or “private” purpose.  Assuming that it can do so,
the Court will still need to determine the quantum of public purposes needed to satisfy the “public
use” requirement.  In particular, there are at least five major levels of public purpose from among
which to choose.
First, the Court could hold that a taking must merely have some public purpose, no matter
how negligible.  Second, the Court could adopt a slightly more demanding standard, requiring a
substantial public purpose.  In other words, not only must the invocation of eminent domain have
a public purpose, but that purpose must be more than a negligible consideration.  Third, the Court
could require that the public purpose be predominant, that is, the public purpose be the main
purpose.  Under this third approach, even if the public purpose is substantial, the taking is
impermissible if that public purpose is not the predominant one.  Of course, determining which of
two or more purposes predominates poses significant problems in close cases (i.e., the cases in which
this standard might produce a different result from the substantial public purpose requirement).
Fourth, the Court could focus on “but for” causation, and require that the public purpose be so
compelling that the project would have been approved even if decision-makers had ignored any
private purpose.  In other words, the court would have to determine whether any private purpose was
a “but for” cause of local officials’ decision to invoke eminent domain.   Fifth, the Court might159
adopt the most demanding standard, that the presence of any private purpose invalidates the taking,
no matter how significant the public purpose.  160
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at § 7.03[5][d], at 7-49 to 7-50.
 Justice Scalia raises these questions in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and161
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  See text accompanying footnotes 198 to 212 infra.162
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As others have noted, subjective tests are beset by a conceptual difficulty — which actors’
motives are critical?  Surely there will be a number of people involved in proposing the project from
private lobbyists to elected city leaders to civil servants.  Does the illicit motive of any one of them
bar the taking?  Or must the person with illicit motives have played a pivotal role, that is, must the
person’s contribution have been essential to the decision to proceed with the project?  Or are the
illicit motives of even such a critical participant dispositive in light of the proper motivation of other
equally critical participants in the process?161
As we have seen, the congruence and proportionality tests may not perform well given the
uncertainty of the underlying substantive constitutional doctrines regarding public use.  However,
the congruence and proportionality tests may permit a more relaxed and deferential review of
congressional legislation in the context of constraining state and local invocations of eminent
domain.  First, the Court may find more deferential review of congressional eminent domain
legislation appropriate because any regulation imposed upon the states need not involve abrogation
of sovereign immunity, a particularly critical aspect of state sovereignty.  (Of course, as discussed
below, the eminent domain power might be considered an equally significant sovereign prerogative
of state government).   Second deferential review of congressional legislation seeking to restrict162
takings to those that serve a “public use” may be appropriate because such laws will seek to vindicate
a fundamental right, which merits heightened scrutiny, rather than an equal treatment right asserted
by a non-suspect group united by some characteristic, like age or disability. 
Since City of Boerne v. Flores, every Enforcement Clause case in which the Court has
applied the congruence and proportionality tests involved abrogation of state sovereign immunity,
a particularly critical attribute of state sovereignty recognizes, at least to some extent, in the Eleventh
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from private suits central to sovereign dignity”); Federal Maritime Comm’n v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743,
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Note that the invocations of eminent domain for urban redevelopment are usually made by localities.
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(Kennedy, J., concurring)(“It must be noted, moreover, that what is in question is not whether the Congress, acting
pursuant to a power granted to it by the Constitution, can compel the States to act. What is involved is only the question
whether the States can be subjected to liability in suits brought not by the Federal Government . . . but by private persons
seeking to collect moneys from the state treasury without the consent of the State.”); TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1379-80;
TRIBE, supra note 8, at 1377 (“might these decisions mean only that some policies may not be enforced through private
lawsuits for damages — hardly a retrograde idea for the Court to advance?”). 
  Hibbs, 538 U.S. 731 (rational basis plus allows more relaxed and congruence analysis — this time because the165
classification was one that required intermediate scrutiny; Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 529 (2004) (rational basis
plus allows more relaxed congruence and proportionality analysis).
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Amendment.   Arguably Congress’s Section 5 power to authorize private claims for money163
damages against states is far more limited than its Section 5 regulatory powers over states.  Notably,
despite constitutionally-recognized sovereign immunity, the federal government may not only
impose regulatory restrictions upon states, but may also pursue lawsuits against wayward states to
enforce those regulatory restrictions.  In short, the Court may provide Congress greater leeway in164
constraining state and local use of eminent domain because, unlike most statutes based on the
Section 5 power that have come before the Court since City of Boerne v. Flores, any federal eminent
domain legislation would not abrogate state sovereign immunity.
The interest that Congress seeks to protect through restrictions upon state and local takings
may affect the rigor with which the Court applies the congruence and proportionality tests.  When
Congress seeks to protect rights that the Court itself protects, in the context of constitutional
adjudication, by subjecting government action to heightened scrutiny, the rigor of the congruence
and proportionality tests are relaxed.   In Hibbs, the court upheld the Family and Medical Leave165
Act, explaining that the congruence and proportionality tests were less demanding because gender
classification received intermediate scrutiny, unlike the classification in Kimel and Garrett, which
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473 U.S. 432 (1985)(disability); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)(poverty).
 527 U.S. 627 (1999).169
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involved classifications subject only to rational basis scrutiny.   In Lane, the Court applied the166
congruence and proportionality tests with less rigor because the statutory provisions under review,
which ensured the handicapped physical access to courts, vindicated the right of access to courts, an
amalgamation of several fundamental rights that give rise to heightened constitutional scrutiny.167
The Court’s “rational basis” language in Kelo suggests that a landowner’s claims that his
property has been taken for private use receives a level of scrutiny resembling that applicable to
classifications based on age, disability, and poverty,   But fundamental rights, like the right to168
practice religion, the right to speak, and the right to own property, differ from equal treatment rights.
Government classifications that burden fundamental rights are subject to heightened scrutiny, and
this could justify the more relaxed congruence and proportionality review, as suggested in both
Tennessee v. Lane and in Hibbs v. Winn.
However, Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank,  addressed a federal statute remedying state appropriation of property.  The State claimed169
that Congress had exceeded its Section 5 powers in enacting the statute.  The Court found that the
statute failed the congruence and proportionality tests, and did not appear to have employed any sort
of relaxed scrutiny.  However, the Florida Prepaid analysis would not govern review of a statute
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seeking to limit state and local official’s taking powers to protect citizens right to retain title to
possession of their property.  Florida Prepaid involved a federal statute that required the state to pay
damages to patent holders when states infringed patents.  A state could unquestionably acquire the
property at issue if it paid the owner, and the Court concluded that Congress has not established
sufficient state violations of citizen’s right to property in the patent context.  In particular, Congress
had not shown that the remedies for such infringement under state law were not fully effective in
ensuring that patent owners received compensation for state infringements of their patent.  A federal
statute seeking to limit the state and local authority recognized in Kelo would seek to vindicate a
different interest, a property owner’s interest in preventing the government from taking his property
at all, even assuming the government were prepared to pay compensation.  Thus, the effectiveness
of the state remedies providing for compensation, critical in Florida Prepaid, would be irrelevant
— because they would not vindicate the property owner’s interest.  The only relevant state remedies
would be those that resulted in preventing or rescinding the government’s acquisition of the property
against the owner’s will.170
The proportionality test may well leave some significant leeway for congressional legislation
seeking to constrain state and local use of eminent domain.  The contrast between the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“the RFRA”), overturned in City of Boerne v. Flores, and the Family and
Medical Leave Act, upheld in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, is instructive.  The
RFRA subjected all state and local action to invalidation if that action “substantially burdened” the
exercise of religion, unless the relevant government body could demonstrate that its action furthered
a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means.  The RFRA’ s coverage was “universal,”
it applied to all branches of the state government, to all state officials, and all individuals acting
under color of state law, and restricted the operation of all statutes and the implementation of
statutory or other state law.  Moreover, the RFRA subjected such state action to scrutiny that equaled
that of the most demanding constitutional test.
The FMLA required employers, including state governments, to allow middle and lower level
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precedence over their occupational dueis, while men did not — and that such stereotypes led to employment
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employees to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave annually to care for an ill spouse, child, or parent.
The majority found the statute proportional to the constitutional violations resulting from state and
local application of gender stereotypes with regard to the relative familial responsibilities of men and
women.   In making this finding, the Court noted that many employees were exempt from the171
operation of the statute, namely employees who had been with their employer for less than one year,
as well as those in high-ranking or sensitive positions, including state elected officials, their staffs,
and appointed policymakers.  Moreover, the FMLA did not require the employer to pay the employee
during such leave, and the twelve-week maximum duration of FMLA-mandated leave was modest.
The Court observed that unlike the RFRA, which broadly applied to every aspect of a state’s
operations, the FMLA had been “narrowly targeted at the faultline between work and family —
precisely where [unconstitutional] sex-based overgeneralizations” persist.172
Some of the potential congressional responses discussed above focus rather precisely either
on 1) counteracting the pressures that may well lead local officials to use of eminent domain to
further private parties’ private purposes, or 2) seeking to ensure that in certain limited circumstances
states and localities’ decisions to invoke eminent domain become subject to more than perfunctory
scrutiny, scrutiny that surely will not even approach the rigor of the “strict scrutiny” standard
employed in certain equal protection contexts.  Nevertheless, the more precisely Congress focuses
any eminent domain legislation on real threats that local officials will use eminent domain to further
private purposes or will fail to seriously consider the limits on their eminent domain powers implicit
in the “public use” requirement, the more likely the congressional legislation is to be upheld.
Finally, while certainly not required, a jurisdiction-specific approach to legislation, like that which
characterizes the Voting Rights Act, may be particularly appropriate.  In particular, the wide disparity
in both the incidence of economic development takings in various states and the procedural
limitations on the use of eminent domain, suggests that the risk of local officials taking property for
private purposes will likely vary quite substantially depending on the state in which the invocation
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of eminent domain occurs.
In short, despite the Court’s recent federalism rulings, section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment can provide a basis for some efforts to precisely target state and local abuses of eminent
domain.
B.  The Commerce Clause
Given the extraordinary breadth of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, the Clause may
have more potential than the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause to serve as a basis for
federal legislation restricting local eminent domain practices.  The Commerce Clause’s reach, like
that of Section 5, is limited by federalism concerns exemplified by the Tenth Amendment.  Prior to
United States v. Lopez,  the argument that the Commerce Clause provided an adequate basis federal173
legislation restricting the use of eminent domain would have been relatively routine.  Surely, in the
aggregate, the numerous instances in which eminent domain is used to take real estate and transfer
it to business entities for commercial redevelopment substantially effected the national economy.
Lopez, and United States v. Morrison,  have imposed constraints on the breadth of Congress’s174
Commerce Clause power.   In particular, when Congress seeks to legislate with regard to intra-state175
non-commercial activity, the Commerce Clause may not provide legislative authority, even if the
activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.   And, indeed, in Gonzales v. Raich  the176 177
Justices primarily responsible for Lopez have suggested a limited definition of the term “commercial
activity,” which would leave more activities beyond the reach of Congress’ Commerce Clause
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powers.   Even after Lopez and Morrison, however, Congress’ power to regulate commercial178
activity remains virtually boundless.179
Acquisition of property by eminent domain likely qualifies as commercial activity, and, the
activity, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.  The acquisition
of real estate would ordinarily qualify as a commercial activity.  However, a localities’ acquisition
of real property by eminent domain does not involve a market transaction, the acquisition is an
exercise of a sovereign prerogative.  The Court has not had occasion to consider whether the exercise
of a sovereign prerogative can be considered commercial activity.  Ordinarily the governmental and
non-governmental activities of government entities are distinguished, and sometimes subjected to
different rules and constitutional constraints.  However, there is no reason to conclude that the180
exercise of a sovereign prerogative should never be considered “commercial activity” for purposes
of delineating Congress’ regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause.
Moreover, land acquisition by eminent domain is in some sense equivalent to a market
transaction, it accomplishes the same goals and the measure of “just compensation” largely seeks
to replicate the financial results that would have obtained had the property been acquired in the
market.  Certainly the exercise of eminent domain powers neither resembles mere possession of an
article, as was the case in Lopez, where the Court held that regulation of possession of firearms in
the vicinity of a school lay beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause powers.  Nor does it resemble
commission of an act of violence, which, in Morrison, the Court found not amendable to VAWA’s
reach because the violence in question was not commercial activity.  The use of the takings power
is not even like the cultivation and personal consumption of a product, as was the case in Raich,
where four dissenting judges found that the regulation lay beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause
powers.  And, of course, the acquisition of real estate by eminent domain is particularly likely to be
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viewed as commercial activity when it is part of series of transactions resulting in the transfer of
property to private entities for profit-making activities.
Localities’ acquisition of land by way of eminent domain has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.  The acquisition of property by eminent domain, by itself, might often, though certainly
not invariably, involve purely intra-state activity, a local government acquiring property from a local
resident.  Even apparently wholly intrastate “transactions,” between a local government and an in-
state resident might have a sufficient impact on the market for real estate sought by out-of-staters,
both individuals and commercial interests, to effect the flow of individuals and businesses into the
area across state lines.  More importantly, though, the acquisition of real estate by eminent domain
for redevelopment must be considered in light of the localities’ plans to subsequently transfer the
property acquired by eminent domain to a real estate developer or some other commercial entity.
Surely the acquisition of a number of parcels to create a commercial project that will attract many
individuals and possibly house businesses operating interstate qualifies as an activity that
substantially affect interstate commerce.  And surely real estate development, in the aggregate, has
a substantial effect on the national economy, even if the residents and customers living, working, or
shopping in the completed economic development project will be in-state residents.  Such activity
surely has effects on large developers and the construction industry, and may well have a significant
impact on the real estate market in general.
The power to regulate interstate commerce permits congressional regulation of local use of
eminent domain for two reasons.  First, eminent domain serves a substitute for a market transaction,
and Congress may legislate to ensure that the differences in the two processes do not operate in a
way that subject property owners individually or the real estate market as a whole to harm when
eminent domain takes the place of market transactions.  Second, Congress may legitimately seek to
address the undue influence interstate commercial enterprises gain over local government by their
ability to play one tax-strapped locality off against another.181
Congress should have the power to regulate a process that circumvents the market in real
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estate, which, after all, is a major national market.   While eminent domain seeks to approximate182
the market valuation of land, it may not precisely do so, or may do so only at the cost of significant
litigation expenses.  Arguably, when the private market can operate adequately, and is not beset by
imperfections that distort the market facing private entities that seek to amass land for major
projects, the market should be allowed to operate.   Developers or other major commercial interests183
should not have the option of enlisting local authorities to acquire property by eminent domain in
such circumstances.
Congress may also act to remedy any unfairness to property owners who involuntarily
become involved in such an alternative process for the purchase and sale of property, particularly
when the entities that will ultimately gain title are interstate enterprises.   As we have seen, the184
measure of “just compensation” does not adequately account for the special value of property not
reflected in its market price.  If property owners could refuse to sell their property unless offered the
price at which they were willing to sell, they could perhaps recover the sentimental value of the
property, or an amount truly sufficient to obtain equivalent accommodations.  If interstate enterprises
can secure property by enlisting local authorities to invoke eminent domain, property owners who
have a sentimental attachment to their property, or who will find it hard to purchase replacement
housing, or who just want to gain some financial compensation for undergoing the rigors of moving,
are left without a remedy.  In short, Congress could potentially find that in many situations the use
of eminent domain for economic development is a wasteful alternative to market transactions, and
one that places property owners whose homes or businesses are acquired in a worse position.
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Congress can also act to address the undue influence of developers or major enterprises,
many of whom are interstate in scope, on local governments.  As noted earlier, there is a long-185
standing tradition, exemplified by the work of James Madison, of concern about the susceptibility
of local governments to powerful or dominant local interests.  The basis of such concerns and the
potential effect on the exercise of eminent domain powers by local authorities is not merely
speculative.
Local governments in particular rely heavily on property taxes and commercial taxes, and
often find their revenues insufficient to satisfy their constituents’ demands for government services.
Local government may, in short, find themselves in economic trouble, and also find themselves
competing with other financially-strapped localities in their own state or in others to entice business
to locate plants, offices, or other lucrative facilities within their jurisdiction.  Indeed, one of the
enticements localities use in this competition is a willingness to use eminent domain or threaten
property owners with the prospect of eminent domain to assist an enterprise in assembling parcels
of sufficient size to suit it needs.   The competition between cities has become so intense that at186
least one scholar has characterized it as “a second Civil War.”   Congress is not powerless to187
counteract the untoward effects of such competition, including the undue influence on local officials
making land use decisions that interstate businesses gain as a result.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has
already held that Congress may legislate to prevent states from being drawn into a “race to the
bottom,” offering more lenient regulation than their neighbors to lure business enterprises into their
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jurisdiction.   Congress can surely address such tendencies when localities wield their eminent188
domain powers to displace citizens in an effort to remain competitive in attracting businesses.189
In addition, there is a legitimate concern about the potential influence of money on officials
who make decisions to invoke eminent domain.  In particular, legal political contributions or illegal
pay-offs from developers or other commercial interests may influence local officials’ decisions to
displace property owners to make way for another private entity.  Congress should be able to take190
steps to minimize the risk that a process which serves as a substitute for market transactions is
subject to such corrupt influences. 
Congress presumably has the power to enact legislation focusing more precisely on
condemnations related to interstate commerce, such as condemnations involving sports teams.  Thus,
for example, Congress could enact a statute prohibiting a locality from acquiring a team by eminent
domain,  or the use of eminent domain to provide land for the owner of professional sports teams191
to build a stadium.   Or Congress might seek to legislate to protect small businesses as an essential192
component of the economy.  For instance, some argue that use of eminent domain for economic
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development has a particularly detrimental effects on small businesses.   Congress might find such193
impacts especially disturbing given that, arguably, small businesses create between sixty and eighty
percent of all new jobs in the country and employ at least half of all private sector workers, while
also acting as particularly critical supporters of social and charitable activities that improve the
quality of life in small communities.   And indeed, one theme underlying the congressional194
criticism of Kelo is a concern about the effect of eminent domain on small businesses in areas
targeted for economic revitalization.195
However, unlike the statutes that have been the subject of many of the Supreme Court cases
discussing the scope of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce, a statute that sought to
limit localities’ use of eminent domain would limit a sovereign prerogative of the state, the ability
to acquire land by eminent domain.  The Court might view such a limitation on a sovereign
prerogative as raising significant Tenth Amendment and Guarantee Clause concerns.   And indeed,196
Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, as well as Kelo suggest
particular solicitude to local government efforts at land management.   Moreover, the Court has197
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shown particular solicitude to states when federal authorities intrude into areas in which state and
local authorities traditionally have a preeminent role.  The Court has already recognized land use
regulation as one area in which state and local governments have historically maintained just such
a preeminent position.198
Like sovereign immunity, the power of eminent domain may be such an inherent attribute
of sovereignty that Congress, even acting pursuant to its enumerated powers, cannot significantly
diminish it.  Accordingly, just as the Court has carefully protected the states’ sovereign immunity,
and viewed recognition of state sovereign immunity as an essential expression of respect for the
states as independent sovereigns, the Court may carefully protect the states’ eminent domain powers,
and thus subject any federal legislation that purports to limit that power to heightened scrutiny.  The
power of eminent domain, like sovereign immunity, has been recognized by courts as an essential
attribute of sovereignty and has an impressive historical pedigree.
The federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, and the state courts have long
considered the power of eminent domain as an inherent and essential attribute of sovereignty.   The
courts have held that “the power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in
every independent state.”   A government’s power of eminent domain does not require recognition199
in any constitution, but exists in absolute and unlimited form at the sovereign’s inception.   Indeed,200
constitutional provisions relating to eminent domain neither directly nor impliedly grant the power
of eminent domain, but simply serve as limitations upon a power that exists independent of a
constitution and would otherwise be unlimited.   In these respects eminent domain resembles201
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sovereign immunity.   “The taking of private property for public use upon just compensation is so202
often necessary for the proper performance of governmental functions that the power is deemed to
be essential to the life of the state.”   “It cannot be surrendered, and, if attempted to be contracted203
away, it may be resumed at will.”   The power of eminent domain “extends to all property within204
the jurisdiction of the state.”  205
The historical claim for eminent domain as an inherent aspect of sovereignty is also strong.
The power of sovereigns to acquire property within their jurisdictions has its origins in Ancient
Greece and Rome.   The term “eminent domain” as a description of the sovereign power to take206
property derives from the Latin phrase dominium eminens, attributable to Seventeenth Century Dutch
jurist Hugo Grotius.   The power was well-established in England at the founding of the colonies,207
and the colonies frequently invoked it.   Indeed, in colonial practice, eminent domain was208
sometimes used for private purposes, such as creating private ways or mills, and there was no
absolute right to compensation, though the need to compensate was often recognized as an
obligation.   “The power of eminent domain was thus well established in England and the colonies209
by the time of the American Revolution, and the obligation to make compensation had become a
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necessary incident to the exercise of that power.   At the commencement of the Revolution, the210
powers possessed by the British Parliament devolved to the governments of the respective states.211
The power might be deemed necessary for acquisition of property for government ownership
or use by the populace as a whole.  But surely, critics of Kelo would argue, governments have no
inherent power or essential need to acquire property by compulsion to aid private economic
development.  As a matter of historical practice and judicial precedent, the power of eminent domain
has not been so limited.  Moreover, the power to use eminent domain in aid of economic
development might be seen as critical in terms of local government’s taxing powers, that is, its
ability to raise sufficient revenue to operate.   In various contexts, courts have recognized that212
government collection of revenue is particularly critical, and should be particularly immune from
interference.   In addition, use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment may also be213
essential to a community’s ability to continue its own existence as a viable community.   A
community surely requires more than government-owned buildings, and may even require facilities
other than those open solely to the public.
In sum, the Commerce Clause would provide a basis for a statute limiting state and local
eminent domain powers, but a court would also consider the degree of infringement upon a key
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attribute of state and local sovereignty.
C.  The Spending Clause
The Spending Clause  allows Congress to spend money, and Congress may condition grants214
in aid upon the aid recipients’ satisfaction of certain requirements.  Congress can impose such
limitations not only upon private recipients of federal largess,  but on state and municipal recipients215
of that largess as well.  For example, in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission,  the Court upheld216
application of the Hatch Act, limiting political activities of civil servants, to state officials whose
employment is financed with federal funds.217
One noted commentator has suggested that “few internal limits exist to restrain” Congress’
spending power, including its power to impose grant limitations.   Not surprisingly, the Court has218
not invalidated a grant condition imposed upon states as exceeding Congress’ Spending Clause
powers since the 1930's.   Nevertheless, the Court has pointedly noted on at least two occasions in219
recent years that those powers have limits.   In South Dakota v. Dole,  the Court explained that220 221
a law passed pursuant to the spending power must meet four requirements.  First, the expenditure
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must further the “general welfare.”   Second, any conditions imposed upon state expenditures of222
federal funds must be clearly expressed in the applicable statute, so that states can make a knowing
choice in accepting a grant.   Third, the grant condition must be related to “‘the federal interest in223
particular national projects or programs.’”  Fourth, because “other constitutional provision may224
provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds,” enforcement of the condition
must be consistent with the remainder of the Constitution.   This fourth requirement, however,225
accords Congress great latitude in conditioning grants on the grantee’s agreement to relinquish
constitutional rights or constitutionally-recognized sovereign prerogatives.  Quite apart from the four
principles set forth above, the Court continues to recognize a principle, left over from the 1930's, that
Congress may exceed its spending powers if “the pressure [exerted by a funding condition] turns into
compulsion and ceases to be an inducement.”   However, the Court has failed to give much226
definition to the concept of “coercion” in this context.  In particular, given that federal authorities
undoubtedly possess authority to condition grants-in-aid in ways that will influence state choices,
the Court has yet to define the quantum of financial pressure that constitutes illegitimate coercion
rather than mere legitimate encouragement. 
In New York v. United States,  decided several years after South Dakota v. Dole, the Court227
expressed its concern about the breadth of Congress’ spending power.  The Court observed: “Where
the recipient of federal funds is a State, as is not unusual today, the conditions attached to the funds
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by Congress may influence a State's legislative choices.”   Accordingly, the Court noted, the228
requirement of a relationship between a funding condition and the program’s purpose was critical,
else “the spending power could render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits of federal
authority.”  229
The Spending Clause, and more particularly the scope of Congress’ power to impose
conditions on grant recipients, raises issues that have bedeviled courts and commentators for years
in many contexts.   The federal government clearly must possess the power to direct the230
expenditure of its money by conditioning provision of its funds on the recipients’ commitment to
spending such funds in accordance with federal wishes.  When the federal government chooses to
accomplish some goal indirectly, by providing funds to an intermediary who will perform the needed
tasks, rather than directly, by performing the tasks itself, the intermediary cannot be free to disregard
the intended scope of the use of the funds.231
Indeed, while the federal government may not use its regulatory powers to prohibit private
citizens’ exercise of their constitutional rights or states’ exercise of their constitutionally-recognized
prerogatives, nothing in the Constitution requires the federal government to fund the exercise of such
rights or prerogatives.  Thus, for example, the federal government may not prohibit women from
terminating their pregnancies in many circumstances or place undue regulatory burdens on such a
right,  but it need not financially assist women’s efforts to terminate their pregnancies, and may232
even refuse to fund doctors’ provision of referrals to women who seek to consider abortion as an
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-58-
option.   Similarly, the Twenty-First Amendment, which commits the regulation of liquor to the233
states,  may bar the federal government from compelling states to raise their legal drinking age to
21,  but Congress may condition federal highway funding to states upon state adoption of such an234
increase in the drinking age.   Thus, the federal government can ensure that its funds are spent for235
its intended purposes.   Even more generally, Congress may ensure that federal funds are not236
subject to possible misappropriation or theft by ensuring that grant recipients are responsible,
including, for example, ensuring that state civil servants are not subject to political pressures that
may lead them to make decisions based on improper considerations.237
On the other hand, given the pervasiveness of federal programs, the power to place conditions
on federal funding could serve to undermine individual rights and state prerogatives if left
unlimited.    If the federal government may condition funding on the state or a private citizen238
refraining from using its own resources to engage in some activity, the state government or the
private citizen may, as a practical matter, lose that sovereign prerogative or individual right.   For239
example, if Congress withheld all federal aid to states that do not generally waive their
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constitutionally-recognized immunity,  state governments would have no choice but to waive that240
immunity.  Indeed, this risk that federal grant conditions may undermine state sovereign immunity
led the Court to adopt the strong presumption that federal statutes do not condition funding on state
waiver of sovereign immunity.   Such conditions show disrespect for the state as an independent241
sovereign — to advance federal policies such conditions would limit the state’s ability to use its own
funds or exercise its own sovereign prerogatives at the direction of its citizens.242
Thus, these two principles, the federal need to control the use of resources it provides and
the importance of private citizens and state sovereigns retaining their discretion over matters the
Constitution commits to them, must be accommodated. 
The various federal interests in controlling the expenditure of federal funds can be grouped
into four somewhat distinct categories.  (In describing these categories, I will sometimes use cases
in which states restrict the use of their funding, when such limitations provide crisper examples of
a particular interest.)   The first set of interests can be characterized as “program definition” interests.
Here, Congress imposes restrictions to ensure that grant recipients spend grant funds for the purposes
the program was designed to serve, and not for other purposes, even meritorious ones, that Congress
finds less critical, or at least less worthy of its funding.   Thus, a government program for medical243
assistance may prohibit reimbursement for cosmetic surgery or fertility treatments, because Congress
sought to fund necessary care, not elective procedures or therapies.   In part, the governmental244
interest in Maher could be characterized as program definition, namely Connecticut may simply have
found it more important to assist the indigent with child birth, and found services for terminating
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pregnancy less worthy of funding. 
The second category of federal interests served by grant restrictions can be termed
“symbolic” or “dissociative.”  Here, the federal government seeks to avoid endorsing a particular
practice in which recipients wish to engage, and does so by refusing to allow the use of federal funds
to facilitate that activity.   Here Congress’ concern is not that the activity harms the operation of245
the government program, undermines the benefits provided by the federal program, or interferes with
the program’s accomplishment of the government’s objectives; rather Congress simply does not wish
to endorse or facilitate the practice.  The regulations implementing Title X of the Public Health
Service Act, at issue in Rust v. Sullivan, provide an example of a funding limitation embodying a
“dissociative” interest.  The federal regulation prevented grant recipients from providing referrals
to doctors who offered abortion counseling because the Administration disapproved of abortion, not
because providing women with referral to doctors who would discuss the abortion option would
harm the program.  Removing the restriction would not have cost the government money, and indeed
might actually have lowered the cost by relieving the government of the expense of providing
prenatal services to women who would decide, for their own reasons, to exercise their constitutional
right to terminate the pregnancy.  Nor would the removal of the restriction have made circumstances
more difficult for impoverished women who wanted to carry their fetus to term.
The third type of federal interest that leads Congress to impose grant restrictions can be
characterized as “functional.”  Frequently, a government program may not work effectively unless
the federal government can control certain aspects of grant recipient’s conduct and practices.  Such
control may be necessary, even if it involves conditioning grants upon grantees’ relinquishment of
constitutionally-recognized rights or sovereign prerogatives.   For example, in Wyman v. James,246 247
plaintiff aid recipient challenged the policy of home visits by social service agency caseworkers as
a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.  Undoubtedly, the Fourth Amendment would ordinarily
bar government officials from entering plaintiff’s home, at least without a warrant or probable cause.
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However, the government was entitled to demand that plaintiff consent to such visits, despite
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights, because the government was entitled to determine the manner
in which its funds were being spent and assess the grant program’s effectiveness.   Similarly, in248
South Dakota v. Dole, South Dakota had a governmental prerogative, expressly recognized by the
constitution, to regulate the sale of alcohol within its borders.  However, Congress could condition
provision of highway funds on South Dakota raising its legal drinking age to 21, because of the
prospect that 18, 19, and 20-year-old drivers who had consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication
might imperil other drivers using the federally-funded highways.249
The fourth type of government interest furthered by grant limitation can be termed
“protective.” The government imposes the grant restriction to prevent some harm from befalling the
federal government.  For example Congress may prohibit use of funds for certain purposes because
such funding would make certain issues legitimate matters for political conflict.  FCC v. League of
Women Voters,  provides an example of the Supreme Court’s consideration of a law serving this250
sort of “protective” purpose.  In that case, non-commercial broadcasters challenged the grant
restriction prohibiting federally-aided non-commercial broadcasters from broadcasting editorials.
In enacting the challenged statute, members of Congress had expressed concerns about government-
funded propaganda, and feared that the content of government-funded political commentary would
become the subject political contention.  In their view only private parties, and not the government,
should fund the expression of editorial opinion.
A different type of “protective” interest is exemplified by the Solomon Amendment,
requiring educational institutions that receive federal funding to provide military recruiters the same
access to career services facilities that it provides to recruiters for employers that do not exclude
openly-gay individuals from employment.  The Amendment is clearly a congressional response to
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
  Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 224-28 (3d Cir. 2004)(discussing the history251
of the Solomon Amendment and subsequent modifications).  The Amendment not only withholds Defense Department
funds to offending institutions, but also funds administered by the Departments of Transportation, Labor, Health and
Human Services and Education.  Id. at 226.  A full analysis of the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment is beyond
the scope of this paper.  However, its constitutionality will surely turn on the question of whether the Constitution permits
the federal government to impose conditions on grants largely unrelated to the purpose of the grant programs.  In general,
the federal government should have some leeway to use funding conditions to attempt to ensure that it is not subjected
to unfavorable treatment, either at the hands of private citizens or state governments.
  Grant conditions designed to further civil rights, like those challenged in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 478-80252
(1980), and Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568-569 (1974), fall within Congressional legislative authority, because the
Enforcement Clauses of the Civil War Amendments grant Congress the power to eradicate discrimination by public and
private authorities, and the Spending Clause can be used to carry out government preferences that it can legitimately
express through other enumerated powers.  Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 478-80; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217
(O’Connor, J. dissenting); Kaden, supra note 105, at 895.  Thus, were Fullilove still good law with regard to affirmative
action, Congress could clearly impose such affirmative action requirements on state and local recipients of federal grants
with regard to expenditures of federal money.  In addition, of course, a functional argument could quite possibly be made
for such civil rights requirements.  See generally, Kaden, supra note105, at 881.
-62-
the decisions of educational institutions, most notably law schools, to disassociate themselves from
the military because of the military’s exclusions of openly-gay individuals from military service.
The Amendment clearly seeks to induce such institutions to interact with the military despite their
opposition to its policies.  The withdrawal of funds is not really directed at the purpose of many of
the aid programs, which seek to provide educational opportunity.251
My claim focuses upon distinguishing the symbolic and functional federal interests served
by grant conditions.  Stricter limits should be imposed on government use of grant limitations to
further symbolic interests than on grant restrictions that serve functional interests, at least when the
conditions exert financial pressure on states (or private citizens) that influence their choices in
deciding matters constitutionally committed to them.
With regard to symbolic interests, Congress has a legitimate interest in refraining from
facilitating state practices, but has no legitimate interest in penalizing states (or a private citizens)
who decide to engage in those practices merely because it disagrees with the state’s (or the private
citizen’s) decision to do so.  The federal government can legitimately express its abhorrence of
certain practices by specifying that its money will not fund such practices.  Absent some other
enumerated power, like Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause,252
Congress should lack the power to penalize states for making decisions that conflict with federal
preferences, when the state uses its own resources in accordance with the preferences of its citizens
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as perceived by their elected representatives.  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering
cases suggest that the ability of the citizenry of a state, acting through its elected state officials, to
direct the use of that government’s general revenues, is a critical attribute of the “republican form
of government” each state is guaranteed under the Constitution.    Thus, at most the federal253
government should have the power only to ensure its own neutrality.    In any event, Congress’254
mere disagreement with the decisions states make in the exercise of their prerogatives should not
provide a legitimate basis for imposing grant conditions penalizing states for such choices.255
By contrast, the Spending Clause should be viewed as providing Congress with broader
power to pursue its functional interests in federal spending programs. The federal government must
have the authority to ensure that recipients do not spend federal grant money in ways that frustrate
the goals of a federal spending program, even if that means conditioning funds on states exercising
their sovereign prerogatives in accordance with federal wishes.  South Dakota v. Dole provides a
good example of the importance of this sort of congressional power.
Congress had a legitimate interest in ensuring that 18-20 year olds did not use the federally-
funded highway system while drunk and, thereby, endanger other highway users.  Congress could
have done so by barring inebriated 18-20 year olds from entering the highway system.  While the
approach is precisely calibrated to address the government’s interest, it is wildly impractical.
Congress could have sought to protect drivers using federal highways by simply barring 18-20 year
olds, inebriated or not, from the highway system.  Such a less-precisely-tailored solution would
surely have proven somewhat impractical as well (though not as impractical as the first
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suggestion).   But more importantly, that approach would be unfair — why should sober 18-20 year256
olds, and for that matter sober 16 and 17 year olds, be barred from federally-funded highways
because a disproportionate percentage of drivers in their age cohort drive on such highways while
inebriated and cause a disproportionate number of accidents?
Congress chose a practical and fair solution to the danger posed by drunk-driving teens, but
one that intruded more deeply on constitutionally-recognized state prerogatives (and on individual
liberty, albeit any freedom to consume alcohol is not constitutionally-protected), conditioning funds
on states prohibiting anyone under 21 from drinking, whether they would use the federally-funded
highway system, keep to state highways, or refrain from driving at all.  These sorts of decisions about
the limitations on states or individuals needed to accomplish the federal purpose are typically
accorded great deference,  sometimes even when individual rights and state prerogatives are at257
stake.  Such congressional decisions regarding the need for certain statutory provisions to effect the
federal interests should receive equal deference in the context of spending power challenges.  In the
spending context, as in other contexts, such decisions involve engaging in sensitive factual inquiries
and making difficult predictive judgments, and such inquiries and assessments lie more within the
competence of the political branches of governments than that of the courts.258
Now contrast the actual South Dakota v. Dole with a hypothetical one.  In the hypothetical
case, the Congress disapproved of state statutes lowering the legal drinking age to 18 because
Congress simply disagreed with the state judgment, and sought to justify its refusal to provide
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highway funds to states allowing 18-20 year olds to drink on its desire to avoid symbolically
endorsing such state decisions.  In other words, rather than serving a functional purpose, the
limitation on state authority merely serves a dissociative one.  In a sense federal funding would
facilitate 18-20 year old drinking — if the federal government held firmly to denying federal
highway funds to states whose legal drinking age was lower than 21, the recalcitrant states would
relent and prohibit such 18-20 year olds from drinking.   Thus, in a sense, the absence of the federal259
grant condition would be a necessary, and indeed important, condition precedent to teen drunk
driving.  However, in such a case the federal stance would hardly be considered a neutral one.  Even
absent the grant limitation desired by Congress, federal funds would not actually finance teen
drinking, such as they would if the federal government funded beer distribution that was destined
for drinkers not only older than 21, but younger ones as well.  Rather, the federal government is
using conditional funding and the prospect of its withdrawal to change the decisions of state officials
with whom it disagrees.  The highway program is designed to provide funds to create safe and useful
roads, and in general decisions are intended to be made on that basis,  and that statutory purpose260
thus provides a baseline for states’ legitimate expectations.  Withdrawing such funding because of
disagreement with a state policy can be viewed as coercion, not merely removing encouragement.
Courts have been particularly careful with conditional funding that interferes with critical
powers of coordinate sovereigns,  other branches of government,  or private institutions,  as well261 262 263
as conditional fund that in practical effect expands a government’s regulatory powers.264
The concern about undermining critical aspects or powers of coordinate sovereigns is evident
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in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.   The Court has recognized that states possess a265
power to choose who they will do business with and may wield that power to prefer their own
citizens.   As the Court has explained, states “may fairly claim some measure of sovereign interest266
in retaining freedom to decide how, with whom, and for whose benefit to deal.”   In the 1980's and267
1990's many state and local governments used their procurement discretion to express their
disapproval of foreign governments, first in South Africa and then in many other countries.   One268
of the countries targeted was Myanmar.  In Crosby, the Court invalidated Massachusetts’s policy of
precluding its contractors from doing business with the Government of Myanmar.  While the case
was narrowly decided on obstacle preemption grounds (which limits state and local power, but not
federal power),  the Court observed more generally that Massachusetts’s use of its procurement
power interfered with the nation’s, and in particular the President’s, power to conduct foreign policy.
Presumably a state could decide that it itself would not do business with a company based in a
country whose regime it abhorred, though even then Congress might have the power to preempt such
a state or local provision.269
The concern about interfering with other branches of government is evident in Crosby as
well, with a concern not merely about federal prerogatives, but about Presidential prerogatives and
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the President’s ability to take action with regard to matters the Constitution commits to his
discretion.  Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez provides a second illustration of the Court’s concerns
about grant conditions that intrude upon another branch of government.  In Velazquez plaintiffs
challenged a federal statute and implementing regulations that limited entities receiving Legal
Services Corporation grants from accepting representations designed to change welfare laws or
challenge the constitutional or statutory validity of welfare statutes or regulations.  Congress can
choose to fund the litigation it considers most important.  It cannot, however, use grant restrictions
to limit lawyers who receive grant funds in ways compromise their essential function in the judicial
system, namely raising all issues presented by a case that warrant judicial consideration.  In resolving
cases, judges rely on lawyers to fully present the relevant arguments, including arguments that
government officials have exceeded their constitutional or statutory authority.  Allowing funding that
imposes such a restriction impermissibly intrudes upon the judiciary’s domain by interfering with
the proper operation of the judicial system.   The mere decision to fund certain cases and not others,270
however, would not have such an effect — it would merely express Congress’ view that some types
of litigation were more essential, or at least more worthy of funding, given the intense competition
for federal funds.
Some cases exhibit judicial concern about grant restrictions that interfere with private
institutions, and in particular their essential functions or attributes.  Velazquez exemplifies this sort
of concern as well.  Lawyers not only serve a governmental function, but a private one as well,
namely representing clients.  That representation has essential features, including a duty of loyalty
to the client, requiring the lawyer to put the client’s interests above others, even those funding the
representation.   The Congressional limitation threatened to compromise that loyalty.  The grant271
restriction rested on the presumption that the role of legal aid lawyers, at least in part, is to
communicate the government’s message or otherwise serve the government’s purposes.  Coopting
an established institution, like legal representation, to communicate the government message was,
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the Court found, constitutionally impermissible.   The Court characterized some of its other272
holdings in these terms, though it did not necessarily use this theory as a rationale at the time of those
decisions.  Thus, it explained, in Arkansas Educational  Television Commission v. Forbes  it had273
rejected a minor candidate’s claim of a First Amendment right to participate in a debate sponsored
by a public television station because exerting such authority of a broadcast station, even a publicly
owned one, was inconsistent with the editorial discretion essential for broadcasters.  More
particularly, “the dynamics of the broadcasting system gave station programmers the right to use
editorial judgment to exclude certain speech so that the broadcast message could be more
effective.”  274
Finally, the concern that grant restriction might facilitate the undue expansion of the grantors’
power can be seen in the market participant cases.  (Granted the market participant doctrine is not
merely limited to grants, and indeed primarily takes the form of expenditures used to purchase goods
and services, but the governmental power exercised is sufficiently analogous to the spending power
to warrant consideration.)  As noted earlier, the Court recognized that the Commerce Clause was
designed to limit state regulatory power, and was not directed at its participation in the market.
While a state could not prefer its own citizens by imposing regulation that favored its citizens,  it275
could favor its citizens in deciding with whom it would deal.   It quickly became apparent that276
states could magnify the effect of wielding their limited market power by not only requiring that their
contract partners be state citizens, but in requiring those contract partners in turn to deal exclusively
with citizens of the state.  For example, South Dakota specified that any company that dealt with it
must offer its lumber to the state citizens on a preferred basis.  The State could not have imposed
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such a requirement by regulation, but its“market participant” power proved an effective substitute
for its regulatory power.
In South-Central Timber Development Co. v. Wunnicke the court stopped this trend.  While
the market participant exception allowed states to choose their contracting partners based on
residency, it did not allow states to enforce restrictions on who those contractors could use as
contracting partners.  In effect, the Court attempted to draw a line between spending and market
participation on the one hand and regulation on the other.   277
So what is the scope of Congress’ spending power in the context of Congress’ impending
effort to limit state and local use of eminent domain?  Congress may clearly prohibit federal funds
from being used to pay “just compensation” for property taken in circumstances Congress finds
abhorrent.  Surely Congress can also preclude states from using federal funds to pay for certain tasks
that are a part of the eminent domain process, such a bringing lawsuits to acquire property by
eminent domain.  But Congress should not have the power to de-fund segregable aspects of the
redevelopment project because of it disapproves of  the state’s decisions to exercise its powers of
eminent domain.   Funding should be made regardless of local choices with regard to eminent278
domain, except to the extent that acquiring land by eminent domain for economic development gives
particular localities an identifiable advantage.  The federal government could take steps to analyze
grant applications so as to counteract such a competitive advantage.  It certainly should not be able
to use withholding transportation funds provided based on certain formulas or merits criteria in order
to express its disapproval of local official’s choices with respect to invoking their power of eminent
domain.
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CONCLUSION
Members of Congress from across the political spectrum disagree with Kelo v. New London,
and find ample support from an outraged citizenry.  But responding to the decision poses something
of a challenge for Congress.  Senators’ and Representatives’ initial inclination seem to be to simply
establish the rule endorsed by the dissent and rejected by the majority, that acquisition of land for
economic revitalization cannot qualify as a “public use” that allows state and local authorities the
power to use eminent domain.  Members of Congress seek to establish such a rule not by exercise
of its regulatory authority, but by using federal grant programs as leverage.  Whether Congress
wishes to use its regulatory powers or its power of the purse, the assertion of preeminence as a
constitutional interpreter implicit in such an approach will likely lead the Supreme Court, and indeed
the lower federal courts, to invalidate the legislative initiative.  The above analysis suggests that a
more narrowly focused approach to protecting property owners from appropriation of their land for
private use might well be grounded on the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Commerce Clause, or the Spending Clause.
* * * * *
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